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In March, 1944, within a period of two days, only two weeks after its introduction in the 
New York State Legislature, the legislature passed, and Governor Dewey signed, a bill that became 
section 61-b (now section 627) of the New York Business Corporations Law.  The statute created a 
right for a corporation, sued derivatively by one or more stockholders who owned less than 
$50,000 in value or 5% of its outstanding stock, to demand that the plaintiffs post a bond as 
security for the corporation=s expenses, including attorneys fees. 1The first of its kind, similar 
statutes now exist in nineteen states.  Almost every state has some form of statute restricting the 
standing of derivative suit plaintiffs.2
It=s certainly not unusual for a state legislature to pass a statute; that=s what they do.  But 
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1At the same time it passed a related statute requiring that the plaintiff have held his shares at the time of the 
wrong complained of.  Several years earlier, and under circumstances similar to those under which Section 61-b was 
passed, the legislature passed a statute requiring corporations sued derivatively to indemnify defendants (but not 
plaintiffs) who were wholly or partly successful for their reasonable expenses, including attorneys= fees.  
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 Deborah DeMott, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE, '3.01, (1999). 
2Section 61-b had a highly unusual birth. Most New York legislation originated either within the 
legislature, the New York Law Revision Commission, or the Judicial Council of the State of New 
York. In this case, none of these were even involved, and none of them were asked for their 
opinions.3  Moreover, the statute seems to have been opposed by all of the major bar organizations 
of New York City, including Athe Committee on State Legislation of the New York County 
Lawyers= Association, the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, and 
the Law Reform Committee of the New York City Chapter of the National Lawyers= Guild.@4 No 
hearings were held, and debate was minimal.  Lawyers and judges at the time pretty much 
universally recognized, for reasons that shall become clear, that the statute effectively eliminated 
derivative suits by making them far too expensive for a plaintiff to maintain.5
Where did Section 61-b come from?  It was the gift of the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, an organization of businessmen which had no governmental authority.  Quoting from 
Forbes Magazine, Zlinkoff reports that A>The New York State Chamber of Commerce . . . is not in 
fact a state chamber at all and is indeed entirely different from most chambers of commerce.  It is 
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(1944).  The New York County Lawyers= Association was dominated by the small firm and sole practitioner Jewish 
bar, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York was dominated by the large, Protestant AWhite Shoe@
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 Victor House, Stockholders= Suits and the Coudert-Mitchell Laws, 20 NYU L. Q. Rev. 377 (1945). Moreoever, 
Zlinkoff, in his very careful article, doesn=t mention the ABCNY at all.  The lack of formal record is significant 
because the Association of the Bar was dominated by the very big firm WASP lawyers who play the villain in this 
piece and would have no reason to oppose the legislation.  Thus the lack of formal record calls into question the 
strength and intensity (and indeed the sincerity) of their opposition.
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3strictly a New York organization composed very largely of extremely conservative corporation and 
financial interests of that City.=@ 6  One year prior to the bill=s introduction in the legislature, the 
Chamber of Commerce had commissioned a report that purported to study the abuses of derivative 
actions and to recommend reform. The report was only released simultaneously with that 
introduction.
One might applaud a policy that restricted stockholder litigation to those stockholders who 
demonstrably had a significant financial interest in the corporation. It is, after all,  a way of 
deterring unworthy suits. One might also take the same attitude towards Justice Rehnquist=s only 
securities law opinion in his thirty years on the Supreme Court, the 1975 Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores7, which in a different way imposed important limitations on the ability of 
plaintiffs to sue corporations for securities fraud and began three decades of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that imposed increasingly tight restrictions on plaintiffs. And one might even 
approach with a similar perspective the so-called Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 8, 
which grew out of the ill-conceived Contract with America and which has created the embarrassing 
situation for an irate Congress that it may well make it difficult for Enron stockholders to recover 
their losses.
One might approach these restrictions with this attitude.  One might see them as a 
legitimate attempt to protect an otherwise helpless corporate America from the pernicious threat of 
greedy plaintiffs= lawyers who promiscuously file lawsuits and in so doing damage stockholder 
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4interests, interfere with corporate efficiency, and embarrass and discourage innocent directors and 
officers.  And in an age in which a small handful of very wealthy plaintiffs= firms seem to form a 
litigation cartel, one might have a point.9
But there=s a different perspective from which one could approach these doctrinal 
developments, and it doesn=t take a lot of evidence to demonstrate its potency. The 1944 Act was, I 
shall argue, adopted as a proximate (but almost certainly not the sole proximate) result of deeply 
ingrained antisemitism in the New York bar and corporate world, antisemitism which not only 
colored their approach to these issues but created the very structural conditions which made the 
argument supporting the statute seem persuasive.10 While hardly a monocausal explanation for the 
statute or the attitude towards stockholder suits that motivated it (strike suits do, after all, occur), it 
is at a minimum the template upon which these restrictions were built. It is a particularly urban and 
eastern form of  antisemitism whose attitude and structural consequences demonstrably persisted 
well into the 1960s. There even are hints that it lurked behind Rehnquist=s rhetoric in Blue Chip 
Stamps (rhetoric found nowhere in the briefs). And that ingrained, if no longer easily visible, 
antisemitism, animates our contemporary attitude toward stockholder suits and plaintiff=s lawyers, 
an attitude that motivated the passage of the 1995 Act. It continues to poison the way we think 
about stockholder suits today.
One doesn=t have to look far for the evidence. In fact the very genesis of this Article is the 
9
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5tone of judicial opinions that have applied the security-for -expense statute, as well as the tone of 
opinions like Blue Chip Stamps.  It=s a troubling tone that has led me to examine the substantial 
empirical data that exist with respect to the New York bar in the middle of the twentieth century.  It 
is the tone of the critical (and deeply methodologically flawed) New York Chamber of Commerce 
Report (the AWood Report@)11 that served as the argument in favor of the legislation.  It is a tone of 
contempt and suspicion.  And while it is impossible for me to prove causation directly, since there 
is no smoking gun that reveals antisemitism as a driving cause of the statute, the circumstantial 
evidence demonstrates that this in fact is the case.
Interesting as an historical matter, you might say, and not surprising either.  But we=re past 
that now.  Antisemitism in the bar, while to some extent still extant, is mostly ancient history.  We 
can evaluate these and other restrictions on stockholder suits purely on a policy basis.  You might 
say that.  But you=d be wrong, because we don=t. The pervasive negative attitude towards 
stockholder suits, whether derivative or class action, continues irrationally to poison our attitudes 
towards plaintiffs= lawyers and their role in our corporate system. To read the legislative history of 
a statute like the 1995 Act is to see that its passage was a function of attitude and lobbying B no 
significant empirical data is cited to support its conclusions.12 And its burden fell unequally, almost 
exclusively on eastern, urban Jewish lawyers.
As recent events from Enron to WorldCom continue to show, the trust in corporate 
optimistic, even in their pessimism, is borne out by the statistics discussed in Part II.
11
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6America and the concomitant distrust of the corporate plaintiffs= bar that are implicit in the rules 
are unjustifiable.  These attitudes and the laws they engender are the relics of antisemitism, and 
they are attitudes which have increasingly led courts and legislatures to let corporate managers off 
the hook.  Even modern finance theory, upon which I=ll briefly touch in Part I, illogically and 
inconsistently fails to treat stockholder suits in the same manner as other nonsystematic risks.  
Recognizing this should lead us to rethink our attitudes toward stockholder litigation and the laws 
and policies with which we regulate it.  It should make us more attentive to the benefits of this 
litigation, as well as the recognized costs it imposes, and lead to empirical work evaluating the 
actual effect that stockholder litigation has on our corporate wealth.  Most of all, it should make us 
stop to examine our attitudes and test them against the world as we know it, not against a world 
tainted with racism and bigotry.
In Part I, I will take a few pages to show how portfolio theory logically ought to make us 
relatively unconcerned with stockholder suits, a concern that is so great that it amounted to a 
virtual witch-hunt (including a congressional override of President Clinton=s veto) in Congress=
passage of the 1995 Act.  In Part II, I will describe the structure of the New York bar from the 
1930s through the 1960s, drawing on the rich empirical and sociological evidence available. Part 
III will examine the law restricting stockholder suits and analyze and criticize its contemporaneous 
justification. In so doing, I will connect this law to the data in Part II in order to demonstrate 
circumstantially (which is the only way one can demonstrate such things) the original and 
persistent antisemitic roots of the doctrine.  I will conclude by linking this history to the 1995 Act.
I want to be clear that at no point in this article will I analyze the wisdom of the restrictive 
stockholder suits B it certainly doesn=t examine the benefits.) 
7policies themselves B that has been amply done by others.  My argument is more narrow, and at the 
same time more broad.  It is, in short, that whenever we confront issues regarding stockholder 
litigation, as Congress did in 1995, we must do so aware of the fact that our overwhelmingly 
negative attitude towards such lawsuits is rooted in an ugly legacy of antisemitism, an 
understanding that should make us more cautious in restricting stockholder litigation and more 
attentive to hard, empirical data.
I. Finance Theory Supports Stockholder Litigation For the Same Reasons it Supports 
Diversified Portfolios
I said I wasn=t going to debate the merits of  restrictions on stockholder suits, and I=m not. 
But I do want to start by using modern finance theory to demonstrate the irrationality of the 
opposition (or at least to demonstrate the purely ideological nature of the opposition) to 
stockholder litigation, an irrationality (or ideology) that lurks in that most rational of disciplines.  
Modern finance theory tells us (as Enron pensioners evidently learned the hard way) that the best 
investment strategy for any investor, and the best way for an investor to protect herself, is to 
diversify her portfolio.  Holding different baskets of securities instead of putting your eggs all in 
one means that if one of your portfolio corporations does poorly, it will likely be offset by superior 
performance by another.  Or, to shift metaphors, if you bet the farm and lose, you lose the farm.  So 
instead of betting the farm, you bet a larger number of truck gardens.
So powerful is this theory that it actually has served as the basis for relaxing managerial 
fiduciary duties.  Why should we protect investors (and in the process perhaps stifle valuable risk-
taking) when investors can protect themselves, or so the argument goes? Of course courts 
recognize that their laxity not only allows for greater risk-taking but provides greater latitude for 
8misconduct, but as long as misconduct isn=t the order of the day, a little unredressed misconduct 
won=t hurt the investor with a well-diversified portfolio.13
There is something to commend this approach.  In my view, there is more to criticize. But 
that=s beside the point.  The relevance of the point to my argument becomes clear when you look at 
the arguments of those who advocate diluting managerial duties and restricting stockholder suits.
Their argument is that meretricious stockholder suits (which on this view is the vast 
majority of them) interfere with business and sometimes cost the stockholders large sums of money 
in settlement payments and legal fees just to get rid of vexatious litigation.14   (Of course the 
assumption that most stockholder suits are meretricious is based on the very prejudice we=ll be 
tracing throughout this article.)  Let=s assume that at least some substantial number of these suits 
are without real merit, or of trivial value.  If there is any value to stockholder litigation, and there 
clearly is, as the sole legal means of enforcing internal corporate governance and as a valuable 
supplement to limited federal resources in enforcing the securities laws, then the fact that some 
individual corporations may be unfairly harmed is just the other side of portfolio theory, at least 
from a utilitarian standpoint.  That is to say, it is well recognized that stockholder plaintiffs and
their lawyers supplement the very limited enforcement resources of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the role of a kind of private attorney general.  And this does have real benefit 
because, left to the Commission alone, much wrongdoing would go unredressed, and the very 
knowledge that the Commission was the only enforcement authority would create an atmosphere in 
13
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9which potential wrongdoers could make cost -benefit decisions based upon the (unlikely) 
probability of getting caught.15  Vigorous stockholder litigation helps to keep corporate managers, 
and our entire corporate capitalist system, honest.  
If this is true (and I think pretty much everyone would accept it as true on some level), then 
the losses incurred by the wrongly- sued corporation (including money paid both in legitimate 
settlements and pay-offs) are made up for by the diminution in fraud and bad conduct caused by a 
more potent enforcement regime in which stockholder suits are more easily brought.  In other 
words, an individual corporation (like an individual= s investment in a particular corporation) might 
suffer, but overall social welfare is higher because corporate conduct is kept at a higher level.  It 
also stands to reason that if corporate conduct overall were lowered, stock prices would generally 
be lower to discount for the greater likelihood that corporate managers would misbehave, and thus 
produce a deadweight loss.16  So, despite the fact that it has been used only to restrict managerial 
duties and stockholder litigation, portfolio theory actually justifies a vigorous private enforcement 
regime with the same power it does the relaxation of managerial duties
Portfolio theory, applied directly, ought to be dismissive of the losses that corporate 
stockholders suffer due to groundless litigation, at least until those losses exceed the value of 
enforcement. In light of the fact that Enron alone, in the space of a couple of months, lost 
approximately $60 billion in market capitalization (shareholder value)17, and in light of the further 
15
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dramatic stock price drops occurring through July 2002 (the time of this writing) due to 
corporations revisiting their financial statements (which is another way of saying that they are 
correcting their frauds or at least their overreaching), it does seem that there would have to be an 
extraordinarily large number of meretricious stockholder suits with very large settlements (usually 
not the case) in order to lead to the conclusion that stockholder suits ought, as an objective matter, 
to be severely limited. And if this is the case, then portfolio theory tells us that a well-diversified 
stockholder should suffer no greater harm from a portfolio company=s settlement of an unjustified 
suit than she should from managerial mismanagement and theft.18  The argument seems so obvious 
as to be almost not worth making. But nobody has made it.
Why not?  Why wasn=t this as obvious to the scholars applying portfolio theory to argue in 
favor of deregulation as were the virtues of a diversified portfolio?  Among a number of possible 
reasons is that we remain blinded by the prejudice against stockholder plaintiffs and their lawyers 
sown in the 1930s and >40s and embedded in the earlier restrictions on stockholder litigation and its 
reasoning.  We don=t see it because we have internalized an ideology arising from bigotry and 
prejudice.19  Once we recognize this, we can perhaps more objectively balance the value of 
stockholder litigation with the desire to discourage meretricious lawsuits.
Having seen, as a theoretical matter, the obvious financial merit of stockholder litigation to 
a vigorous market, I will now turn to the central point of this Article, the very reason why we fail to 
18
 The argument assumes, as I stated earlier, that the benefits of stockholder suits exceed the costs, including 
the costs of frivolous or strike suits. To my knowledge, nobody has ever designed a method for testing this proposition 
(nor one to the contrary I might add).
19
 In support of this observation I will have occasion, infra, to discuss the very interesting distinction 
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Decisionmakers Breach the Prejudice Habit, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 733 (1995).
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see the merit of stockholder suits.
II. Jews Without Money20
In 2002 it might be hard to imagine a time in America not only when antisemitism was 
widespread and virulent but, given the singular success of Jews in America,  it may be even harder 
to imagine a time when the vast majority of American Jews lived in dire, grinding poverty, when 
substantial numbers of children were orphaned or had only one parent, when children not yet 
teenagers worked twelve hour days or more in horrible sweatshop conditions, when overcrowded 
and dangerous tenements and the unbearable stench of the Lower East Side of New York made it 
difficult for parents to imagine that their children or grandchildren would inhabit executive suites, 
Wall Street law firms, or Park Avenue medical offices; that they would acquire high political 
position, and so many other fruits of the American dream.  But this was the condition of the 
average American Jew in the period of highest immigration from central and eastern Europe, 1880 
to 1920, and for some time after.21
At the same time, there was a Jewish elite in America that had begun to establish itself in 
the 1840s and was firmly ensconced in the highest reaches of business and banking, and even 
politics, by the beginning of the flood of eastern migration.22  This group, with names that still 
adorn our financial and cultural institutions like Lehman, Lewisohn, Schiff, Goldman, 
20
 The heading is the title of Michael Gold=s 1929 autobiographical novel, which depicts the extreme poverty 
and difficult living and social conditions of Jews on the Lower East Side of New York in the first half of the twentieth 
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21Howe, supra note __.  
22Stephen Birmingham, OUR CROWD: THE GREAT JEWISH FAMILIES OF NEW YORK (1967); Howe, supra note 
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Seligman.
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Guggenheim, Sachs, Kuhn, Loeb, Warburg, Seligman, and many other lesser-known yet still 
prominent families, were largely accepted into non-Jewish circles, both professionally and B within 
limits B  socially.23  Their origin was Germany, where the Haskalah, or Jewish enlightenment, led 
by philosophers such as Moses Mendelssohn, encouraged Jews to throw off the trappings of 
orthodoxy and assimilate into Protestant German society on the debatable grounds of modernity. 
(Mendelssohn=s own son converted to Lutheranism, though his grandson, the famous composer 
Felix, maintained a Jewish cultural identity.)  The elite of this group had little trouble assimilating 
into Protestant American society, for the cultural norms and practices which separated them were 
few, and their socio-economic status became quite similar.24  Many even intermarried within the 
Protestant elite, and some even converted.25  Most were Republican, at least until the late 1920s.26
It is undeniably true that even this elite class of relatively assimilated Jews were still subjected to 
some suspicion and hostility, as Edith Wharton novels27,  the antisemitic ravings of the otherwise 
23
 Birmingham describes the social limits rather vividly.  Birmingham supra note __.
24
 Birmingham details the origins of many of these families. In a large number of cases, the first generation 
left the orthodoxy of their parents immediately upon boarding ships for America, although most maintained some 
(although rapidly diminishing ) degree of Jewish observance upon reaching the United States and achieving their early 
successes.  Birmingham, supra note __.   My argument is not, therefore, that these early immigrants were children of 
the Haskalah (in fact many lived in restricted Judengasse and had only limited contact with broader German society, 
see Robert A. Caro, POWER BROKER (1975),  but merely that the environment in which they lived in Germany, 
including closer contact with the non-Jewish population than in the case of their Eastern coreligionists,  were such as 
to prepare them for rapid assimilation in America.  For other studies of this migration and assimilation see Leonard 
Dinnerstein, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA (1994); Howe, supra note __.
25
 Birmingham, supra note __.
26
 Howe, supra note __ at 361-2. Howe points out that the majority tended to vote Democrat on the local 
level, but that German Jews tended to remain Republican whereas Eastern Jews overwhelmingly voted Democrat, 
although not consistently so. Id. at 368.
27 See esp. THE HOUSE OF MIRTH (1905).
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brilliant Henry Adams28, and the numerous stories of slights told by as accepted a Jew as Bernard 
Baruch illustrate.29  But most were sufficiently accepted to be willing to put the occasional slight 
aside.30
It wasn=t until the mass migration of eastern Jews, following the death in 1881 of the 
relatively liberal Czar Alexander II and the ascension of his son, accompanied by horrific pogroms 
and the release of pent-up antisemitism among both the Russian elite and the liberated serfs, that 
American antisemitism on a widescale basis began to manifest itself.  Even then, it was largely 
directed at the new, stranger, immigrants from the east, who had retained their orthodoxy and had 
been consigned in the Pale of Settlement to dire poverty, immigrants who arrived poor, dirty, 
bearing the physical trappings of their religion, and speaking the odd patois of Yiddish.  Again the 
story is well known that while their Americanized German brethren eventually provided charity 
and other forms of help, they too were somewhat repelled by their distant cousins and, in the time-
worn tradition of immigrant Jews everywhere, were concerned that these new, impoverished, 
unassimilated immigrants would embarrass them by association.31 ANative@ Americans viewed 
these immigrants with even more suspicion and outright hostility, and even other immigrant groups 
28 See, e.g., VI THE LETTERS OF HENRY ADAMS (J.C. Levenson, Ernest Samuels, Charles Vandersee, Viola 
Hopkins Winner, eds., 1988), 301, 369, 390.
29
 Howe, supra note __.  The most notorious slight of the era was the refusal of the Grand Union Hotel in 
Saratoga Springs to admit Joseph Seligman in 1877, by which point he was considered a banker of reputation only 
below that of J. P. Morgan and was an intimate of and advisor to President Grant.  Birmingham, supra note __ at 160-
65.
30
 Indeed when they did not, their resistance could cause enormous social upheaval both within the German 
Jewish community and the larger elite American society, as Joseph Seligman=s reaction to his exclusion from the 
Grand Union Hotel in Saratoga Springs illustrates. Birmingham, supra note __.
31
 Howe, supra note _.
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like Italians and Irish  B subjected to prejudice themselves B were concerned that these Jews, who 
would work for virtually anything, would take their jobs, which led to violence (particularly among 
Irish immigrants and their descendants) toward Jews.32
This is the situation that persisted largely up to the 1920s and grew with increasing fervor 
until its peak B oddly enough B during World War II, a period to which Leonard Dinnerstein refers 
as the Ahigh tide@ of antisemitism in America.33  This of course was the period during which 
section 61-b was conceived and enacted. It was a time when the America First Committee, formed 
to keep the United States out of the war, attracted as its leaders Henry Ford and Father Coughlin, 
men who previously had established famously antisemitic reputations.  Leaders of this committee 
insisted that the Roosevelts and A90 percent of the New Dealers@ were Jewish, that Jews were in 
control of the federal government, and that Hollywood producers (who were of course Jewish) 
were making movies designed to lead America into war (and which accusation led to a Senate 
investigation into Hollywood).  It was a time when Charles Lindbergh, fresh from receiving a 
medal from his hero, Hitler, spoke against the Jews who controlled the press, the media, 
Hollywood, and the federal government. While Lindbergh was so heavily criticized that the 
America First Committee virtually disappeared, antisemitism during this period continued to 
32 See e.g.  Dinnerstein, supra note _ at 121 (describing Irish American support for the violent and violently 
antisemitic Christian Front in 1939).
33
 Dinnerstein, supra note _  at 128. It is worth noting that while statistics show a peak of antisemitism 
during this period, there was enormous antisemitism in earlier decades. This earlier antisemitism seems more violent 
and more populist in nature, led by demagogues like Father Coughlin and Henry Ford=s Dearborn Independent. The 
class of WASP about which I am speaking would never have engaged in this crude, largely lower and middle class, 
form of antisemitism.  For an interesting story of the deep racial antisemitism that ran through the American military 
in the years after World War I see Joseph W. Bendersky, THE AJEWISH THREAT@: ANTI-SEMITIC POLITICS OF THE U.S. 
ARMY (2000).
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increase.34  Dinnerstein quotes Jewish actor Kirk Douglas, who easily Apassed@, as saying during 
this period: A>the things that in their nightmares Jews speculate non-Jews say . . . I found out they 
do.=@35
Regularly kept polling data demonstrate increasing antisemitism during this period.36  In 
May 1938, 36 percent of respondents agreed that Jews had too much power in America; by 1945 
(when Hitler had essentially annihilated European Jewry and the Jewish migration to America had 
long been stemmed by the federal government) that number had risen to 58 percent.37  When 
Charles Lindbergh made his famous Des Moines speech in 1941 on behalf of the America First 
Committee, he named three groups he believed were drawing America into the war; Jews, the 
Roosevelt administration, and pro-British groups.  In a survey conducted later that year, 40% 
remembered the accusation against Jews compared with 31% as to the Roosevelt administration 
and 21% as to pro-British groups.38  This leaves the distinct impression that antisemitism had by 
then become a significant part of the American consciousness. And despite this fairly widespread 
belief that Jews were agitating to involve America in the war, once the war had begun at least one-
third of the American population believed that Jews were less willing to serve in the armed forces 
34
 Dinnerstein, supra note __ at 129.
35 Id. at 131.
36 See the rich empirical data contained in JEWS IN THE MIND OF AMERICA (Charles Herbert Stember, et. Al, 
eds. 1966), esp. Chapter 5 (dealing with the World War II era).
37 Id. See also Stember, supra note _- at 121-2.
38
 Stember, supra note __ at 114.
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and less patriotic than even German and Japanese Americans.39  In June 1944, 24 percent of survey 
respondents identified Jews as the greatest menace to Americans, with only 9 percent identifying 
Japanese and 6 percent identifying Germans C and this almost a full year before the European war 
had ended and during a time when Jewry had virtually been wiped out in Europe.40
Antisemitism simply was pervasive throughout America during this era, the era of the 
Wood Report.  Dinnerstein notes a 1942 poll asking high school students who would be their last 
choice as roommates.  The only double-digit negatives were, unsurprisingly, African -Americans at 
78%, and Jews at 45%.  A similar report by Fortune contemporaneously with this study asked 
factory workers who they would least like to have move into their neighborhoods and this time 
African-Americans and Jews were joined by the Chinese (who interestingly scored only 9% on the 
student survey) with 72%, 42% and 28%, respectively. 41  Finally, a poll asking the respondent 
whether he or she had heard any negative comments of Jews during the preceding six months led to 
46 percent affirmative and 52 percent negative responses in 1940, growing steadily to 64 percent 
affirmative and 34 percent negative in 1946, a year after the war ended and the reality of the 
Holocaust had been widely reported.42
39 Id. At 116-7. 
40 Id.  Two years earlier, the results were almost inverse in direction, if not in magnitude, with 24% 
identifying Japanese, 18% identifying Germans, and a still significant 15% identifying Jews. Id. It=s worth noting that 
since all of this polling data explores peoples= self-professed attitudes, there might be an underreporting bias in 
antisemitic attitudes.  Given the general public acceptance of antisemitism during this period it is hard to imagine that 
there is an overreporting bias.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 132. The horror stories of antisemitism during this era, from citizens= groups organized to criticize 
Jews to Coughlinites to the deep antisemitism embedded in textbooks as well as in the military, from ordinary soldiers 
threatening their Jewish colleagues to government training manuals, are sufficient to fill volumes. It seems adequate to 
establish the environment in which the Wood Report was drafted to provide the evidence in the text and refer the 
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Nativism and general anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as class and economic conflict, 
added to the cruder and more virulent forms of antisemitism.  But despite its popular peak in the 
1940s, it had already become deeply embedded in the consciousness of the eastern, urban, 
Protestant elite, that very group that had accepted the German Jews into their numbers.  As Digby 
Baltzell so convincingly reports, it was the relatively quick transformation of  mass Jewish poverty 
into Jewish economic success that led antisemitic attitudes within the Protestant elite to become 
more ingrained.43  From their hegemony in the 1920s, referred to by Baltzell as AThe Anglo-Saxon 
Decade@, by the 1940s WASPS had already begun to withdraw significantly from the public arena, 
defeated by the liberalism of the New Deal, their loss of their power in Washington, and the 
booming economic success of immigrant groups.44  What had principally been for them a matter of 
class (although I don=t mean for a moment to dismiss their latent - and sometimes blatant B racial 
antisemitism)45, now became a matter of caste, as their increasing loss of power to Jews led to their 
interested reader to other sources. See e.g., Steven Alan Carr, HOLLYWOOD AND ANTISEMITISM: A CULTURAL 
HISTORY UP TO WORLD WAR II (2001), ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA TODAY: OUTSPOKEN EXPERTS EXPLODE THE 
MYTHS (Jerome A. Chanes, ed., 1995), Roberts S. Wistrich, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED (1991).
43
 E. Digby Baltzell, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND CASTE IN AMERICA (1964).  This 
book, in which Baltzell, who is credited (evidently wrongly) with coining the acronym AWASP@, spends more time on 
antisemitism than any other social attitude of the WASP elite, arguing that antisemitism largely defined the WASP 
caste. See Eric Pace, E. Digby Baltzell Dies at 80; Studied WASPs; The New York Times, August 20, 1996, Sec. B, p. 
6 (in which Baltzell=s widow is quoted as saying that he was wrongly credited with coining the term).
44
 Such withdrawal in the face of adversity characterized the predecessors of the WASP caste in the Gilded 
Age, as so wonderfully detailed in the whinings of Henry Adams. See THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS (Ernest 
Samuels, ed.).; Baltzell, supra note __ at 112-13.
45
 One might be tempted to think that the story I tell is one based on class rather than antisemitism. I shall do 
my best to demonstrate otherwise infra note __ .  As to the racist aspects of antisemitism, it does appear that the easier 
social acceptance of German Jews in contrast to Eastern European Jews supports antisemitism as a hybrid form of 
racism.  For an argument suggesting the grounding of at least some strain of American antisemitism in racism, see
Jack Wartheimer, Antisemitism in the United States: A Historical Perspective, in ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA TODAY, 
supra note __ at 33, 46.  Bendersky, supra note __, comes down clearly on the side of biology and race in explaining 
military antisemitism, with frightening echoes of Nazi ideology.
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retreat into private and exclusive clubs, resorts, suburban enclaves like Bronxville and Tuxedo 
Park, and the closed urban society of the Upper East Side.  In so doing, they ultimately 
relinquished the role of ruling aristocracy for the more comfortable and less challenging role of 
social elite.  As they saw their power wane, they - the heirs of the colleagues of nineteenth century 
German Jewish financiers B fully internalized the antisemitic stance that had become pervasive 
throughout America.46 Clubs and exclusive neighborhoods, not to mention exclusive social circles, 
provided safety and affirmation. As in the face of the Progressive onslaught during the Gilded Age, 
the A>decent people=@, as Baltzell quotes Edith Wharton as saying, A>fell back on sport and 
culture.=@47
Yet the new class of immigrant Jews was improving its lot through hard work and 
education.  In fact this was precisely why antisemitism among the Protestant elite became so 
pervasive.  Certain kinds of businesses remained relatively open,48  perhaps because commercial 
transactions didn=t require the sustained contact that other kinds of businesses requiring more social 
interaction did. But the professions were different, and the state of the bar, especially in New York, 
is illustrative of the severe limitations on Jewish advancement within the elite ranks of the legal 
profession, limitations which persisted at least through the 1960s.  Jews were excluded from much 
46
 Baltzell, supra  note __; Dinnerstein, supra note __ at Chapter 7. 
 It=s interesting to note some of the parallels between the behavior of the WASP aristocracy and 
nonslaveholding Southern whites in the ante-bellum period.  In each case, the existence of a lower class facilitated the 
maintenance of caste, regardless of personal or individual economic achievement.
47
 Baltzell, supra note __ at 113.
48
  Principally in the soft-goods and retail trades, and of course entertainment.  Heavy manufacturing, 
commercial banking, finance, transportation, and insurance were still the province of the WASP elite.  Baltzell, supra 
note __ at 207-8.
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of industry, engineering and, for the most part, medicine, and while not from law,  certainly from 
the elite corporate bar.  Instead, they turned to other forms of legal practice, including challenging 
those corporations through derivative litigation, in order to make a living.  In so doing, they refused 
quietly to accept their second class status and strived for economic success in the only ways 
available to them.  In so doing, they hit the Protestant elite, which controlled American industry 
and the corporate bar, exactly where it lived.
In presenting the evidence, I will rely as nearly as possible on the extant statistical data.  
Although there is a plethora of narrative description (on which I must and will rely to some extent), 
it is far too easy in a study like this to rely upon horror stories and rhetorical flourishes to make the 
point. Thus, while I might be dry, I shall try to rely on available data rather than normative rhetoric.
One last point. Discrimination between elite (read Protestant) and other lawyers hardly was 
something new.  In fact the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, founded in 1870, was 
itself an attempt to stratify the bar, and every president of the ABCNY from 1870 to 1920 was 
listed in the New York Social Register.49  Its Grievance Committee spent disproportionate amounts 
of time investigating ethnic lawyers who typically were sole practitioners rather than corporate 
lawyers who were members of firms. The American Bar Association was little better.  J. Clay 
Smith, Jr., in his study of Black lawyers, quotes one Ainfluential@ ABA member in the 1920's as 
noting that Athe legal profession was a means by which Jews, immigrants, and city-dwellers might 
undermine the American way of life.@50  Thus, the ABA attempted to shut down law schools 
49
 Lawrence Fleischer, Association of the Bar of the City of New York: 125 Years 1870-1995; The City Bar: 
Then and Now, New York Law Journal, September 11, 1995, p. S1.
50
 J. Clay Smith, Jr., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 (1993); Robert 
Stevens, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983) 100-01; 184; 
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catering to these three groups whom, as we will see, in New York were all one and the same: Jews. 
 And while in the very early years, the Adregs@ of the bar consisted of a more varied group of 
minorities (some Irish lawyers as well as Jews, who were centered at least in part around the 
Tammany Hall machine), by 1944 the demographics of the bar, but not the attitude of the elites, 
significantly had changed.
Concrete evidence of antisemitism appears in a report (the AReport@) based on a study of the 
Conference on Jewish Relations, led by Simon Rifkind. (Rifkind was later to become a name 
partner of one of New York=s premier law firms, a firm that included, among others, Lloyd 
Garrison, dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School and grandson of the great abolitionist 
William Lloyd Garrison, and adopted principles of racial and ethnic equality as well as public 
service.)51 The Report describes in excruciating empirical detail the plight of Jewish lawyers in 
New York in the 1930s.52  It begins by quoting one New York Jewish lawyer as describing the 
practice of law as A>a dignified road to starvation.=@53  And based on the data revealed in the Report, 
this was far more the rule for Jewish lawyers than the exception.  But my interest is not in disparate 
income.  It is in the evidence of discrimination that led to that disparity.
Auerbach, supra  note .
51
 Melvin M. Fagen, THE STATUS OF JEWISH LAWYERS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1 Jewish Soc. Stud. 73 (1939)
 Paul Weiss traces its roots to 1875 but took its modern form in 1946.  Rifkind joined the firm in 1950.  In 
the interest of full disclosure, I spent several happy years as an associate at the firm, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and 
Garrison.
52
 Fagen, supra note __ . Further evidence of bar stratification and its antisemitic basis is provided in 
Richard L. Abel, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) at 85-87, and Edward A. Purcell, Jr., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: 
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992), at 150-154 (discussing the somewhat 
different but sociologically related development of the plaintiffs= personal injury bar).
53
 Fagen, supra note __ at 74.
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Let=s begin with the demographics of the bar.  The Report estimated that approximately 
22,000 lawyers were practicing in all five boroughs in 1937, of whom 11,400 were Jewish.  Of the 
11,400, 9,467 practiced in Manhattan.54   At that time, Jews constituted roughly 28% of the 
population of New York City.55  Clearly the proportion of Jewish lawyers was grossly 
disproportionate to the number of Jews in the population.56
The first interesting question is where these lawyers were educated,  since the Report 
convincingly concludes that an important determinant of income and status within the bar was the 
law school attended.57  Fully 66.8% of Jewish lawyers who had attended law school graduated 
either from Brooklyn (25.8%),  New York University (22.7%, and which was at least 45 to 50 
years away from joining the ranks of the elite), New York Law School (12.1%), St. John=s Law 
School (10.7%), and Fordham (6.2%), none of which even remotely numbered among the elite law 
schools in the nation. The only elite school attended by New York Jewish lawyers in any 
54
 The identification of lawyers in New York was based upon United States census data. The identification of 
Jewish lawyers was done by including those lawyers who listed themselves as belonging to Jewish organizations or 
contributing to Jewish charities, as well as by a search through Martindale-Hubbell for lawyers with Aobviously@
Jewish names. Those lawyers with Aobviously@ non-Jewish names were excluded, and an ambiguous group consisting 
of about 3,000 lawyers was further reduced as much as possible by discussion with lawyers familiar with those in 
question.  Fagen concedes the imprecision of this methodology, supra note __ at 75, and I, whose decidedly non-
Jewish name was bestowed unwillingly upon my family by an insistent customs official, am particularly sensitive to 
this flaw.  Nonetheless, based on its methodology, the survey seems more likely to have underestimated the number of 
Jewish lawyers than overestimated them.
55The population of New York City in 1940 was 7,454,995.  
www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027/tab17.txt.
56
 For an explanation of the sources of population data, see Appendix A.  I have no effective means of 
counting commuting lawyers and their ethnicity living in suburbs like Bronxville, Greenwich, and Scarsdale.  It is 
well-known, however, that Jews had not significantly migrated to the suburbs at this time and that suburbs like those 
mentioned did not welcome Jews.  In the case of Bronxville, it positively excluded them.  For evidence that Jewish 
migration to the suburbs significantly began at the end of World War II see William E. Nelson, THE LEGALIST 
REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980 (2001).
57
 Fagen, supra note _ at 80.  All data contained in the text are also presented in tabular form as appendices 
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meaningful numbers was Columbia (11%), somewhat of an oddity in light of that university=s own 
antisemitic tradition.58
The Report identifies the principal reason for Jewish attendance at lower-level law schools 
in the fact that they had night programs and tuition was cheaper59,  two factors highly important to 
students from relatively poor families. It never mentions antisemitism as a factor at all.  Auerbach, 
Howe, and Baltzell, however, all clearly identify antisemitism as a major factor limiting Jewish 
attendance at elite universities.60
Let=s see how this educational  disadvantage led to a bar structure highly disadvantageous 
to Jews.  In 1937, few Jewish lawyers were corporate practitioners, by far the most lucrative 
practice area. Only 11% of Jewish lawyers reported having a corporate practice, with a large 
plurality dependent upon small merchants (35.28%), and Ageneral@ practice (22.15%).  Sixty 
percent of Jewish lawyers reported being sole practitioners, the lowest income level group with a 
1937 median of $1,874 ($24,105).61  Only 6% reported being the head of a firm (with a median 
to this article.
58
 Fagen, supra note __ at 82.  Columbia was the first elite university to restrict Jewish admissions.  John 
Higham, Social Discrimination Against Jews in America, 1830-1930, in V THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA: AT 
HOME IN AMERICA (Abraham J. Karp, ed. 1969) 349, 369; Marcia Graham Synnott, Anti-Semitism and American 
Universities: Did Quotas Follow the Jews?, in 6 AMERICAN JEWISH HISTORY (Jeffrey Gurock, ed., 1998), 473, 479-
80, 499; William E. Nelson, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980 
152 (2001).
59
 Fagen, supra note __ at 81.
60
 Jerold Auerbach, UNEQUAL JUSTICE, 126-7 (1975); Baltzell, supra note __ at 129-35; 209-12; Howe, 
supra note __ at 411-12. Auerbach, Baltzell, and Howe all were writing after the fact.  It may be that part of the 
reason for the reticence of the Report to identify overt antisemitism as a cause is a tradition of Jewish-American fear 
of stirring even more antisemitism by claiming the existence of antisemitism. See generally Alan Dershowitz, 
CHUTZPAH (1991).
61The numbers following each mean in parenthesis gives the immediately preceding amount in 2002 dollars 
based on the U.S. Department of Labor on-line inflation adjuster. http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  I have used 
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income of $8,879 ($114, 213)), 15% reported being a member of a firm (with a median income of 
$ 4,137 ($53, 215)) and 14% reported working as an employee of a firm (with a median income of 
$4,137 ($53,215)).  The median income for Jewish lawyers as a group was $2,426 ($31,206), 
compared with $2,990 ($38, 461) for all New York lawyers.  Throughout their careers, New York 
lawyers as a group ranged from 21% as firm members (with five to 10 years experience), to 
35.34% as firm members (with 17-23 years of experience), and with comparable proportions (in 
the mid-30% range) for lawyers throughout their careers.  As heads of offices, the most lucrative 
practice situation, lawyers in the general New York population ranged from 14.38% for 5-10 years 
of experience up to a high of 33.38% for 24-34 years of experience. In their early years of practice, 
New York lawyers as a whole were employed overwhelmingly more than Jews in firms, 39.27% to 
9.74% from 4 years or less, diminishing to 22.16% versus 11.82%, 11.27% to 19.93%, and 
reaching a situational reversal of 3.02% to 29.16% for 35 years of practice and more.62  Looking at 
the numbers, the clear explanation for the increase of Jewish firm employees and the decrease of 
employee-lawyers in the general population can be found in the substantial increase in the general 
population of lawyers who became members of the firms by which they were employed, or headed 
their own firms, numbers which remained relatively insignificant for Jewish lawyers.  The vast 
majority of Jewish lawyers did not have firm jobs early in their careers, which of course is the time 
when the track to partnership is established, and this most likely accounts for their small proportion 
of membership in firms. While they may have been more accepted as firm employees when they 
became more experienced lawyers, they were clearly not accepted as firm members.
the same source of conversion throughout this article.
62Fagen, supra at note __ at 86-92, 101-103.
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The conclusion that the vast majority of Jewish lawyers were marginalized in the New 
York bar only seven years before the adoption of Section 61-b is inescapable.63  Nor had the 
situation changed in any meaningful way by 1960, the next year for which significant data are 
available and a period not long before the Supreme Court began to impose substantial restrictions 
on securities litigation.  The data come from a report drafted by Columbia sociologist Jerome 
Carlin (the ACarlin Report@), examining the Asocial conditions of moral integrity in the legal 
profession.@ 64  The Carlin Report, despite its broad ambition, limited its inquiry to the New York 
bar as the nation=s most significant.   Carlin=s conclusions that ethical behavior is a function of 
status within the bar and the determining nature of one=s practice are important, and will become 
relevant later in this section.  For now, I want simply to concentrate on the data that more or less 
parallel Fagen=s 1939 study.
In 1960 (the focal year of Carlin=s data), there were approximately 26,000 lawyers in 
Manhattan and the Bronx, of whom 17,000 were active private practitioners.  Seventy percent of 
these lawyers reported receiving at least 50% of their income from business practice, but the vast 
majority of these represented small businessmen and closely held corporations. Only 20% reported 
that most of their work involved representing large corporations.65 In describing the hierarchical 
structure of the New York bar, Carlin notes that Athe firm is the significant unit for the system of 
63
 Stevens, supra note __ at 146.  (AIn the 1930s to the 1940s, Jewish students were heavily channeled into 
government service, teaching, and the non-elite or predominantly Jewish law firms.  There was still a hint of 
antisemitism among the large firms in the 1960's.@) Indeed, it persisted into at least the early 1980s and may well 
persist today.  See infra notes  and .
64
 Jerome E. Carlin, LAWYERS= ETHICS; A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966)(quote at xxviii). 
65
 Carlin, supra note _- at 11-13.
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social stratification of the bar.@66  While 4,300 law offices with from one to 100 lawyers were 
counted in Manhattan and the Bronx, and more than 50% of lawyers reported working in firms, 
only 21% reported working in firms of 15 or more, a fact which has a great deal of significance for 
bar hierarchy.67
Before linking firm size and the nature of practice with ethnicity, I shall take a brief look at 
the ethnic composition of the bar in 1960.  One interesting change from the 1937 data, which 
reported that only 68.6% of Jewish lawyers were native born in contrast to 80.8% of the bar 
overall,68 is that the Carlin report shows that Aalmost all@ members of the New York bar were 
native born.  More than sixty percent of these were Jewish, in contrast to 18% Catholic and 18% 
Protestant.69  Fully 70% of Jewish lawyers were of eastern European descent (recall the earlier 
class distinction and difference in social acceptability between German and eastern European 
Jews).70  Thirty-six percent of all lawyers graduated from what Carlin describes as Ahigh quality 
university law schools.@
Where a nascent lawyer attended law school was of critical importance to bar status.  In 
66
 Carlin, supra note _ at 18.
67Id.
68
 Fagen, supra note _ at 79.
69
 Carlin, supra note __ at 18 -19.
70
 Carlin=s data refers to all practicing lawyers, regardless of date of admission to the bar. Breaking down the 
data further, he notes that the proportion of Catholic lawyers remained constant, the proportion of Jewish lawyers 
since the Fagen report had declined to 50% in the mid >30s to mid >40s, then rising and stabilizing at 65%, and the 
proportion of Protestant lawyers declined from 25% in the 1920s to stabilize at 10% by 1955. He explains the entry 
into the bar of significant numbers of Jewish lawyers as caused by the rapid expansion of Amixed law schools,@ by 
which he evidently means law schools of lesser quality and characterized at least in part by their offering of night 
programs.  Carlin, supra note _ at 20-21.
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fact, Carlin notes that the social status of lawyers really was fixed upon their matriculation into 
college, beginning a circular trap in which the status of undergraduate institution was dependent 
upon religion and parental socio-economic status, and the likelihood of admission to elite law 
school was dependant upon the status of undergraduate institution, with the result that  Jewish 
lawyers whose parents had relatively low socioeconomic status had little chance of attaining elite 
status in the bar.71
The 1960 data bear this out, but they also tell a more troubling story.  It seems almost too 
obvious to state that there was significant discrimination among Jews at the elite colleges and law 
schools.  As to college, 70% of Protestants of high socio-economic status, 42% of middle socio-
economic status, and 28% of low socio-economic status attended Ivy League or similar quality 
colleges.72  By contrast, 34% of Jews of high socio-economic status, 17% of middle socio-
economic status, and 9% of low socio-economic status, attended similar colleges.  At the top 
schools, the relationship between high socio-economic Protestants and Jews is almost inverse. A 
high socio-economic status Jew was only 6% more likely to attend a top college than a low socio-
economic Protestant (where the difference was 42 percentage points among Protestants).73 To put it 
differently, a low status Protestant had an almost three in one chance of attending an Ivy League 
school.  For the low status Jew the chances were slightly less than one in ten.
71
 Carlin, supra note __ at 22, 28-32.
72
 Carlin uses the term Atop quality colleges@ and provides a category of Aother top quality colleges@ in his 
data.  He does not define these, but one suspects he means Williams, Amherst, Swarthmore, Haverford, Stanford and 
the like.  As any academic knows, the quality and reputation of colleges is fluid.  Rankings didn=t exist at the time, at 
least not in a form I was able to find. See, e.g., Clarence E. Lovejoy, LOVEJOY=S COLLEGE GUIDE (1961-62).
73
 Carlin, supra note _ at 29.  Catholics fared even worse with respect to high-status college admissions, but 
their presence in the bar was dramatically lower than that of Jews. However, Carlin notes that, adjusting for college 
and law school attended, Catholics had about the same chance of being in a large firm as Protestant lawyers.
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Seventy-seven percent of large firm lawyers attended Ivy League law schools in contrast to 
only 20% of small-firm lawyers and sole practitioners.  While the disparity between Protestants 
and Jews attending top law schools diminishes dramatically (though it remains significant) among 
nascent lawyers attending top quality colleges, the initial disparity in college attendance 
considerably magnifies the difference. 74 
But it=s not just about law school and college.  Race played a seemingly independent role in 
bar status.  Only 19% of Jews with a top education were members of large firms compared with 
45% of Protestants.  As Carlin notes, A a Jewish lawyer who achieved high academic standing (that 
is, was selected for the staff of law review) in an Ivy League school has no better chance of being 
in a large firm than a Protestant lawyer who did not >make law review= and who attended a non-Ivy 
League law school.75@
Finally, for our purposes, Carlin demonstrates that there was substantial immobility 
between strata of the bar throughout a lawyer=s career, and that race played an important role in this 
as well.    It should not be surprising by this point to realize that Jewish lawyers had significantly 
less upward mobility and more downward mobility than Protestant lawyers.  One of the important 
practical results of all of this, which I will discuss further in Part II, is that lawyers at different 
levels of the bar had very little contact with one another and very little shared professional 
experience.  As one piece of evidence, it=s worth noting that the prestigious Association of the Bar 
74
 Carlin, supra note __ at 30.
75
 Of course there was substantial self-selection, but this was due to the common knowledge among law 
faculties and Jewish law students that their chances of jobs at big firms were de minimus. My own father (St. John=s 
Law School 1956, law review editor,#2 in his class) reports that he and other Jewish students were carefully directed 
by the dean to those firms that might consider hiring Jewish applicants.  See also LAW PROFESSORS TALK, supra note 
__.
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of the City of New York was dominated by Protestant, large-firm lawyers, while the more plebeian 
New York County Lawyers= Association was populated principally by small firm lawyers and sole 
practitioners (and hence, Jews).76
Needless to say, antisemitic discrimination in the bar at least mirrored the problem of 
antisemitism and racial exclusion in the larger society.77  The marginalization of Jews at the lowest 
levels of the bar (and at the correspondingly lowest income levels), as well as their social exclusion 
from the circles traveled by large-firm elite Protestant lawyers, sets the stage for the suspicion and 
hostility that led to the restrictions on stockholder litigation and our attitude towards the corporate 
plaintiffs= bar.78  Let me now turn to describe those restrictions and their historical development.
III. The Development of Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation
The restrictions on stockholder litigation in which I=m interested cover two principal areas: 
Derivative litigation against corporate officers and directors, and securities fraud litigation, 
typically brought in the form of class action suits against corporations and their officers and 
directors. Class actions, which really only developed in the 1960s, are far more technically 
76
 Carlin, supra note _ at 36.
77
 Baltzell, supra note __.
78
  I point out, as an aside, that such subtle exclusion continues in some Protestant circles today.  In 1998 I 
had occasion to look through the internal directory of one of New York=s largest, historically Awhite shoe@,  law firms, 
a firm that prides itself on its international scope.  Using the same, admittedly flawed, methodology as Fagan, and 
giving the benefit of the doubt to names that could either have been Jewish or German (as well as including more 
innocuous names like Brown and Green which often are Jewish Bunless of course the person=s first name was clearly 
non-Jewish like, for example, Winthrop), I found that approximately ten percent of the partners and associates were 
Jewish. One would expect random hiring for a top New York firm to produce at least 40 percent  Jewish lawyers. 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab note that Aduring the last three decades, Jews [in the United States] have made 
up. . .  40 percent of partners in the leading law firms in New York and Washington. Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl 
Raab, JEWS AND THE NEW AMERICAN SCENE (1995), 26-7. (Presumably the number should be higher since not every 
associate becomes a partner.)  Even discounting for the firm=s tendency to hire principally from elite law schools, this 
suggests that there is some discrimination, no matter how subtle, still going on at this firm, or perhaps B to use the 
mid-century WASP phrase of discouragement B Jews Ajust wouldn=t be comfortable there.@
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complex and have much broader application than derivative actions.  As a consequence, my main 
focus is on derivative litigation, although the attitudes towards plaintiffs= lawyers formed in that 
context transferred to the securities class action context when that became the dominant mode of 
challenging corporate misbehavior.  I=ve already mentioned one of the earliest forms of restriction 
on derivative litigation, section 61-b of the New York Business Corporations Law.   Before 
explaining how the restrictions contained in the statute affect plaintiffs, a brief primer on derivative 
litigation is in order.
The locus of (almost) absolute power in the corporation is the board of directors, a 
statutorily created body with the function of overseeing the affairs of the corporation. Over time, 
the board=s role has evolved from a more managerial to a more monitoring role (including the very 
important function of hiring and firing the CEO). In light of the fact that the board=s powers are 
virtually absolute, the law has imposed on directors (and on corporate officers and other employees 
as well), fiduciary duties to the corporation designed to ensure that those powers are exercised in 
the corporation=s best interest and not for the benefit of corporate insiders or anybody else.  In a 
post-Enron world, it doesn=t require much proof to establish (if it ever did) that directors and 
officers sometimes violate these fiduciary obligations, either by shirking their responsibilities 
(governed by a doctrine known as the duty of care) or by enriching themselves at the corporation=s 
expense (governed by a doctrine known as the duty of loyalty).  It is undisputed that the board is 
the ultimate voice of the corporation.  Hence a dilemma.  If the board speaks for the corporation, 
how likely is it that it will sue itself (or members of the board or corporate officers) in cases in 
which they violate their fiduciary duties?  The answer should be obvious.
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Equity rode to the rescue.79  In order to permit meaningful enforcement of these duties, 
courts created the device of the derivative suit.  Put simply, derivative suits permit a stockholder 
(after making a demand on the board to rectify the situation and having that demand rejected) to 
bring a suit against the offenders in the name of the corporation. Technically the derivative suit is a 
two-part action, the first being the stockholder=s suit against the corporation to bring action, and the 
second the corporation=s suit (through the stockholder as nominal plaintiff) against the offending 
officers and directors.
Contemporary law has developed the procedural prerequisites of derivative litigation to the 
point where it=s extremely difficult for a plaintiff ever to get to the merits of the case. But 
derivative litigation did seem to present a problem.  You see, unless a stockholder owned very 
substantial amounts of stock (and few did), no one stockholder had much of an incentive to sue the 
directors or officers.  Recovery per share was likely to be minimal except in the very rare case of 
massive wrongdoing, and such amounts as were recovered went to the corporation as the real party 
in interest. Thus even if a stockholder were to recover, that recovery would be indirect, in the form 
(theoretically at least) of an increase in share value.
So somebody needed an incentive to sue if the duties were to be enforced at all (since it is a 
pretty ironclad rule of corporate law that only shareholders have standing to sue to enforce these 
duties in the first place). The solution was to permit the successful plaintiff=s lawyer to recover 
attorney=s fees.   Because these cases were taken on a contingent basis (for obvious reasons), the 
79
 For a history of the development of derivative litigation, from its very primitive roots in the 1810 English 
case of Adley v. The Whitstable Co., 17 Ves. Jun. 315, 34 Eng. Rep. 122 (Ch. 1810) through the 1950s see the 
classic, Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders= Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 NYU L. Rev. 980 (1957).  
See also DeMott, supra note __.
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component of recovery reflecting attorney=s fees could be quite substantial, thereby giving lawyers 
an incentive to take the risk of representing a small stockholder in enforcing fiduciary duties and 
thus assuring them of having some meaning.80
But there, of course, is the rub.  For once lawyers had a financial incentive to sue 
corporations, corporations and their lawyers panicked at the prospect of meretricious litigation, 
brought solely for the purpose of forcing settlements and enriching lawyers. And, based on our 
understanding of the demographics of the New York bar (where of course so many of these suits 
were brought), who do you think the plaintiffs= lawyers in these suits were?  Jewish lawyers of 
course.  But that part of our story is for later.
In any event, the prospect of litigation run amok led to the demand for mechanisms to sort 
out the legitimate lawsuits from the Astrike suits.@  Thus was enacted New York section 61-b.81
The reasoning is obvious.  If the problem was excessive litigation instigated by people who had no 
financial interest in the corporation (the lawyers and their shareholding clients) and therefore could 
not be expected to protect its best interests (quite the contrary), discouraging suit by all but the 
most significant stockholders ensured that only stockholders who had the interests of the 
corporation in mind would sue.  Thus, you will recall,  New York 61-b required stockholders who 
owned less than $50,000 in value ($ 507,950 in 2002 dollars) or 5% of the stock to post security 
80
 It is unusual for a winning party to collect attorneys= fees in American jurisprudence.  The origin of the 
rule is in 19th century trust law, where beneficiaries of a common fund were held to be responsible for the fees of 
lawyers whose work benefitted the fund.  By 1939, the rule was universal as to derivative suits.  Hornstein, Counsel 
Fees, supra note __ at __.
81
 In light of the general thrust of this article and with no more appropriate place to put this information, it is 
worth noting that the New York legislature that passed that statute consisted of 51 senators, of whom only 5 had 
clearly Jewish surnames, and 150 assemblyman, of whom 11 had clearly Jewish surnames. This was an era in which 
Jews generally did not seek elective office.  Howe, supra note __ at __.
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for expenses, a costly undertaking in the first place but even more so when one considers that the 
losing plaintiff would forfeit the bond and be liable for defendant=s expenses.  Thus the rule 
virtually ensured that small stockholders would practically be precluded from bringing suit.
Now if you think about it, the rule makes no sense if the purpose is to limit stockholder 
litigation only to those suits having merit. In the first place, as I already noted, recovery in a 
derivative action goes to the corporation, not the stockholder.  Consequently, a large stockholder 
would have invested his time and effort in litigation for the purpose of restoring the corporation=s 
value (and only partly and indirectly his individual wealth), thus posing a classic free-rider 
problem.  Why should a large stockholder bother to sue when so much of the benefit would go 
(indirectly) to the other stockholders anyway?82  And why, indeed, when a stockholder with such a 
large block ought to be in a position to negotiate for a side deal with management on his own? So 
the ultimate effect of this restriction is to prevent litigation altogether, in the absence of a small 
stockholder or law firm capable of bearing the financial risk of the litigation.83  And that, indeed, 
should be the end of our story. But it isn=t quite the end.
First, although I=ve described the perceived problem of derivative litigation as being the 
greed of plaintiffs= lawyers leading them to vex and irritate perfectly innocent (and socially 
82
 The personal benefits to the large stockholder might outweigh the cost of bringing suit.  More likely, even 
if the stockholder had a large, illiquid position which might otherwise make suit worthwhile, he could use the power 
that accompanies the position to pressure management (unless he held a large minority block in a close corporation).
83
 The New York Court of Appeals provided relief to plaintiffs in 1950 in Baker v. McFadden Publications, 
Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E. 2d 876 (1950), in which it held that plaintiffs as to whom the statute was invoked and 
upon whom an order to post security for expenses levied could vacate the order if they were able to solicit sufficient 
additional stockholders to meet the statute=s threshold and act as plaintiffs. According to Stanley Nemzer, a prominent 
New York plaintiffs= lawyer at the time, this pretty much ended defendants= practice of invoking the statute in order to 
avoid plaintiffs= circulating serious allegations of wrongdoing about the corporation or its managers among its 
stockholders. Interview with Stanley Nemzer at the Offices of Wolf Popper, New York City, Friday, April 12, 2002.
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superior) corporate executives with meretricious suits, how big a problem really  was derivative 
litigation?  The answer is that it was a not a major problem at all.  The Wood Report, my analysis 
of which follows, would make it seem like a problem of great significance.  But a survey of the law 
review literature from 1900 through 1944 revealed only 44 law review articles, almost all of them 
student notes, in which derivative litigation even was mentioned.  Most of these were focused on 
the substantive analysis of managerial duties and insider trading, and virtually all of them called for 
strengthening managerial duties and loosening existing restrictions on derivative litigation.  It is 
worth noting, as an aside, that half of these articles were written after 1929,  suggesting that the 
1929 Crash and subsequent Depression provoked greater interest in managers= duties.  This hardly 
indicates that derivative litigation was a problem of widespread concern and attention, at least 
among academics and law students.84
Why the concern then, and how was the statute justified?  While not a problem of academic 
interest, perhaps it was a practical problem.  Professor Hornstein=s tale of a last-minute attack by 
the release of a secret weapon by the New York Chamber of Commerce is born out by the evidence 
and appears in the form of the innocently titled: Survey and Report Regarding Stockholders=
Derivative Suits, authored by Franklin S. Wood on behalf of the Special Committee on Corporate 
Litigation of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York.   The Report covers 117 pages 
84
 For a few examples see George T. Washington, Stockholders= Derivative Suits: The Company=s Role, and 
A Suggestion, 25 Cornell L. Q. 361 (1940) (one of the few articles suggesting reform while expressing the importance 
of shareholder litigation), Note, Rights of Individual Shareholders against Directors Who Secretly Secure Better 
Terms for Themselves than for Others in Sale of the Shares of all Members, 20 Cornell L. Q. 101 (1935), Note, The 
Liability of Directors and Officers for Misrepresentation in the Sale of Securities, 34 column. L. Rev. 1090 (1934); 
Note, The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders= Derivative Suits Against Directors, 34 Column. L. Rev. 842 (1939); 
George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders= Derivative Suits, 34 Column. L. Rev. 784 (1939)(noting, 
interestingly and relevant to my discussion of the Wood Report, that most derivative litigation involved common law 
and early federal securities law insider trading), id. at 797; Note, The Director of a Corporation as a Fiduciary, 20 
Iowa L. Rev. 808 (1935).
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of text, along with four substantial appendices, the last of which consists of 18 elaborate charts 
purportedly detailing every derivative action in New York=s First Department (Manhattan and the 
Bronx), Second Department (Brooklyn, Rockland and Westchester counties), and the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.   It is particularly interesting that the author 
engaged in such detailed examination of the files, yet limited his report to derivative litigation 
without any comparative data on litigation in general.  It is particularly odd in light of the fact that 
in 1934 (two years after the beginning of the ten year period examined by the Wood Report), the 
Judicial Council of the State of New York had begun to compile highly detailed records on all 
litigation occurring in New York State trial courts, records ignored by Wood.85 Although 
contemporaneous critiques of the Wood Report exist, I have analyzed the report independently.86
But first a word about the Committee that supported Wood.  The Committee consisted of 
three members besides Wood; Richard Lawrence, Thomas Parkinson, and Arthur Reis.  Wood 
himself was a prominent New York lawyer who, after graduating from Cornell and Cornell Law 
School, spent several years practicing in Honolulu before returning to New York where he began 
his own practice until joining what became Hawkins, Delafield & Wood in 1945.  Perhaps the 
most interesting aspect of Mr. Wood=s life for our purposes is not his professional life but the fact 
that he lived in Bronxville, a town known for its exclusion of Jews, and was a member of the 
Bronxville Board of Zoning Appeal from 1948 to 1958.  Not only as a resident, then, but as a 
public official, he was undoubtedly quite conscious, and presumably supportive of, the 
85
 21 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1935-44).
86
 Zlinkoff=s, supra note __, is the most thorough and thoughtful, and I shall draw upon his critique for one 
set of data not otherwise readily available.
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AGentlemen=s Agreement@ to exclude Jews that existed in Bronxville.87  Wood was a member of 
the University Club (described by Birmingham as Afor years, the most steadfastly anti-Jewish club 
in New York@)88 as well as several other clubs.89
To locate the other committee members within the WASP caste, Lawrence was a member 
of the Union League of New York and Parkinson a member of the Century Association, both clubs 
identified by Baltzell as high in the ranks of the WASP aristocracy.90  Parkinson was also a 
member of the Washington, D.C. Cosmos Club, itself highly exclusive (and co-founded by Henry 
Adams).  
Arthur Reis was a Jew, an unsurprising fact given the long historical presence of the token 
(or ACourt@) Jew in most non-Jewish establishment organizations, a Jew whose American role it 
was to lend validity to the decisions of the powerful from Athe@ Jewish perspective.91  Nor is it 
87
 Bronxville=s discriminatory history is well-known in the New York area.  Like the antisemitism implicit in 
61-b itself, it is only circumstantially demonstrable (evidently Bronxville builders were not so crude as to include 
restrictive covenants in their deeds), but those circumstances are rather powerful.  See e.g., Harry Gersh, Gentlemen=s 
Agreement in Bronxville, Commentary, February 1959, p.109, Marilynn Wood Hill, Bronxville: From Country 
Hamlet to Suburb, in BUILDING A SUBURBAN VILLAGE: BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK, 1898-1998 (Eloise L. Morgan, ed. 
1998), pp. 17-19.
While the situation undoubtedly has improved, it is worth noting that one Bronxville resident to whom I 
spoke said that things were better, telling me that one of the town board members even was Amarried to a Jew.@  This 
kind of remark, no matter how well-meaning, is of course  precisely the kind of subconscious racism so well described 
by Charles Lawrence. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection : Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).  I confess that I was waiting for my interlocutor to tell me that 
some of her Abest friends were Jewish.@
88
 Birmingham, supra note 261.
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 Like antisemitism itself, Wood evidently was a complex man. He served as plaintiffs= counsel in at least 
one derivative suit in 1934, and was defense counsel in two others.  As plaintiff=s counsel, he worked with a Jewish 
firm.  I don=t quite know what to make of this other than the assertion I already made; Wood, like antisemitism, was 
complex.
90
 Baltzell, supra note _ at 368-71.
91
 The Court Jew actually is a figure who has existed throughout history. The term comes from the German, 
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entirely surprising in light of the fact that Reis was of German Jewish descent which meant, as I 
described earlier in the text, that he was likely to have been socially acceptable at one level and that 
he largely was capable of Apassing.@ And while we know relatively little about him, he likely 
shared the prejudices of his class with respect to his eastern brethren.92    Reis= father, Robert, was a 
German-born Jew who established Robert Reis & Company in 1885.93  The now defunct Robert 
Reis & Company became one of the larger mens= underwear manufacturers.  Arthur Reis joined the 
firm after receiving his A.B. from Columbia in 1903.  He eventually succeeded his father as 
president of the company.94  His wife, Claire Raphael Reis, was also from an unusually privileged 
Jewish background.  She was born in 1888 in Brownsville, Texas but was educated in Germany, 
in which country the Hofjude, or Court Jew, actually became an official position in the courts of many nobles. The 
original function of the Court Jew was as a financial advisor, and often a financier as well, since many of the Court 
Jews were chosen from among the wealthy and because of their excellent business connections.  Court Jews often 
formed family allegiances with other Court Jews which created a kind of upper class among European Jewry, and 
Court Jews were often subjected to the contempt of other Jews because of their strong desire and often successful 
attempts to assimilate into mainstream society. At the same time, because of their high positions, Court Jews often 
were able to, and did, intercede with governing authorities on behalf of the Jewish community.  There were no Court 
Jews as such in America. However, the phrase came to be used as an epithet to describe obsequious Jews who 
attached themselves to powerful political or business men and who were highly discreet and subordinate with respect 
to matters of Jewish concern, thus forgoing the opportunity to help other Jews that was utilized by European Court 
Jews.  See generally Ze=ev Glicenstein, The Era of the Court Jew, The Canadian Jewish News, March 14, 2002, 
www.cjnews.com/pastissues/02/mar14-02/feature3.htm,  Philologos, Court Jews: Our Man in Vienna, Forward, 
February 1, 2002, http://www.forward.com/issues/2002/02.02.01/arts5.html,  David E. Lipman, Gates to Jewish 
Heritage: The Court Jews, http://www.jewishgates.org/history/jewhis/court.stm. , FROM COURT JEWS TO THE 
ROTHSCHILDS: ART, PATRONAGE, POWER, 1600-1800 (Vivian B. Mann and Richard I. Cohen, eds 1996), Selma 
Stern, THE COURT JEW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF ABSOLUTISM IN EUROPE (1985).
92
 I have been able to find out relatively little about Reis other than his background and principal activities. 
Thus I cannot be sure that his attitude towards the class of Jewish lawyers with which we=re concerned was negative. 
The circumstances alone suggest that it was likely that he shared the prejudices of the German-Jewish class, and 
would have been unlikely to have raised, even if he had seen, the antisemitism implicit in the statute and the Wood 
Report. 
93Arthur M. Reis, 64, A Manufacturer, N.Y. Times, December 24, 1947 (obituary) at 21. 
94 Id.
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France and the United States.95  Interested in music, she was very active in promoting and teaching 
classical music in New York City.  She became a well-known authority on the subject, received 
numerous awards, published many articles, and was even  invited by Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
serve on the Committee on the Use of Leisure Time.96  Notwithstanding his privileged  background 
and status, it is unlikely that Reis=s business would, at an earlier time,  have put him at the very 
highest levels of German-Jewish aristocracy, but he was a member of the Century Club which had 
supplanted the Harmonie Club at the apex of German-Jewish Society.97
I said that I wasn=t going to employ excessive rhetoric, but it is worth noting a couple of 
statements in the Wood Report that reflect its deep hostility to derivative litigation.  First, the 
Report uses the term Avexatious litigation ,@ 98 the very term, as we=ll see, that is used by Rehnquist 
in Blue Chip (despite the fact that it appears in none of the briefs in that case).  But even more, the 
Report examines the relationship of stockholder-plaintiff to lawyer and concludes: AThis shoddy 
burlesque of a professional relationship to clients makes the ambulance-chaser by comparison a 
paragon of propriety.@99
95 Donna P. Parker, Reis, Claire Raphael, The Handbook of Texas Online available at
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/RR/fre51.html
96 Id.
97
 Birmingham, supra note __ at 374
98
 Wood, supra note __ at 48.  The term Avexatious litigation@ has been in use since at least the 17th century, 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary and refers to lawsuits brought without merit by Aevil disposed Persons.@
A full etymology of the term is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is clearly meant to cast aspersions on those who 
are alleged to bring such suits.
99Wood, supra note __ at 47 The Aambulance chaser@, by the way, was an earlier term of epithet for 
plaintiffs= lawyers coined by the elite WASP members of the bar.  Of course they were referring largely to Jewish 
lawyers. Auerbach, supra note __ at 42-44.
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In further criticizing the lawyer-client relationship, Wood notes that A . . . an inexhaustible 
supply of the smallest of small investors have suddenly become masters of the most intricate 
details of corporate finance, and the most alert of sentinels to employ attorneys and attack 
corporate management on the slightest suspicion of a big lawsuit.@ He then goes on to note the 
prominence of women among the plaintiffs and lists those suits which feature women plaintiffs, 
after which he rather sarcastically speculates as to their financial sophistication and research 
behavior.  (Sexism, however, is not the focus of this paper.)  What Wood declines to mention, but 
is clear to any reader, is that of the 32 listed actions, the plaintiffs in 21 of them obviously have 
traditional Jewish surnames, with an additional seven (for a total of 29 out of 32) having arguably 
Jewish surnames.  It wouldn=t have taken much for a reader of the time to substitute AJews@ for 
Awomen.@100
More troubling, perhaps, is the disingenuous, if not downright dishonest, methodology of 
the Wood Report, for in detailing the alleged crisis of derivative litigation, it looks only at 
derivative litigation and not at all at how it fares in relation to other forms of litigation.   So let=s 
take a look at the actual numbers, starting with those set out in the Wood Report.  From 1932 to 
1942, Wood identified 1,400 minority stockholders= actions (1,266 after eliminating duplication), 
of which 693 involved close corporations (of no particular interest to us here) and 573 involved 
public corporations.101   Of these, thirteen cases, or 2%, resulted in recovery by the corporation, 33 
100
 Comparing Wood=s text with the tables following the Wood Report, it appears that approximately 20% of 
plaintiffs were women, not an overwhelming proportion but, perhaps, given the time and subject matter of the suits, 
still an unusually large proportion.  It=s also interesting to note the misrepresentation of the text in light of the data 
presented in the tables.  Given the other flaws in the Wood report, it is at least a legitimate inference that Wood chose 
the obviously Jewish female plaintiffs from among this 20% to present in his text.
101
 Wood=s numbers appear in this summary discussion format at pp. 6-7.  Derivative litigation against close 
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(or 6%) were settled with court approval, and 215 (or 37%) were dismissed. Of the 342 cases not 
accounted for, 60 (10%) were Asettled privately@ (presumably without court approval), 155 (27%) 
were discontinued, 54 were still pending at the publication of the Wood Report, and there was no 
identifiable disposition as to the remaining 43.  Wood goes on to note that in those actions that 
were successful (i.e., resulting in a verdict for the corporation), only about 5% of the amount 
claimed was recovered, and in those recoveries based upon court- approved settlements, 3% of the 
claimed amount was recovered.  The solution to eliminating this abuse, according to Wood, is 
legislation in the form ultimately passed as section 61-b, which would Alargely abate@ Athe major 
vices of promiscuous derivative actions. . . .@ 102
But how Apromiscuous@ were these actions and does the data support the conclusion that 
derivative suits presented a crisis so significant that legislation virtually eliminating them was 
justifiable?  In order to evaluate this claim, let=s look at information compiled by the State of New 
York as to litigation generally in the First Department.103
From 1935 through 1942, the average number of civil cases in the First Department ranged 
from 34,429 to 58,579, with a mean of 51,500 cases a year in the First Department.104 The number 
of derivative suits (using Wood=s numbers which include, without distinction, suits involving both 
corporations are not of interest because they principally involve disputes among shareholders,  some if not all of 
whom are managers, and typically involve questions of the distribution of corporate wealth among the shareholders 
rather than wrongdoing by officers and directors.
102Wood, supra note __ at 24
103
 All of the following data is taken from the annual tables presented as this report.  I have calculated the 
proportions.  I have also left out the data from the Second Department as it is consistent with the data from the First 
Department and would lengthen this discussion for no appreciable gain.
104
 I have used the mean instead of median simply because, as the table in Appendix __ shows, they are 
sufficiently close that I thought the mean to be at least as representative a figure as the median.
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closely held and public corporations, and leaving aside the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York as to which comparable data were unavailable)105 ranged from 139 to 80, 
with a mean of 109.   To further put these numbers in context, during the period 1935 to 1942, 
derivative suits ranged from .41% to .22% of all civil cases, or a mean of .29%.  Put differently, 
out of a total of 281,423 civil cases in the First Department during this period, a grand total of 815 
(or .29%) were derivative.  Since 58% of these on average involved closely held corporations, that 
means only 342, or .12%, involved publicly held corporations.106
It seems fair to conclude, then, that as far as the consumption of public resources is 
concerned and despite the very real existence of strike suits, derivative litigation posed no 
significant burden.  At least Wood provides no credible evidence that the negative aspects of 
derivative litigation (the strike suit) outweighed the positives.  But there are a number of potential 
objections to this. First is the possibility that plaintiffs= lawyers made pre-litigation demands on 
boards to obtain bribes.  Next is that the success rate (or even trial rate) of derivative suits was so 
out of proportion to that of all civil litigation that they ought to have been curbed. Third might be 
that  derivative suits were so generally meretricious that they were disproportionately dismissed or 
settled. Fourth would be that the amount of recovery was so low that they were simply harassment 
without significant benefit to the corporation and thus had little justification.
105
 The number of Second Circuit cases were a very small proportion of the total (130 out of 1,400 in all.)
106
 There is no convenient way of backing out the derivative suits brought in the Second Circuit from these 
numbers since Wood purported to eliminate duplicative suits without indicating where they were brought.  Given the 
relatively small number of derivative cases brought in the Second Circuit, it seems fair to conclude that they don=t 
materially affect the results.
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As to the first objection, it may be that even if derivative litigation as litigation did not 
produce significant volume, plaintiffs= lawyers were using the procedures of derivative litigation to 
Ahold up@ corporations and their executives.  With rare exception, a prerequisite to derivative 
standing is that the plaintiff has served a demand on the board to correct the action of which he 
complains.  Perhaps plaintiffs= lawyers engaged in a practice of promiscuous demand-making, 
leading corporations to make payments in the nature of bribes to discourage them from filing 
lawsuits.  If this were true, plaintiffs= lawyers could well have had a valuable business in derivative 
litigation that never reached general public view, and the comparative paucity of derivative suits 
would have no bearing on the scope of the problem which could nonetheless have been significant 
for corporations.
Such a story is implausible.  Or rather, it is only plausible to the (implausible) extent that 
plaintiffs= lawyers never talked with one another and therefore the (implausible) extent to which 
corporations would have been able to keep such payments secret.  Otherwise, as Macey and Miller 
note with respect to strike suits, such payments would be rare.107 The reason is that corporations 
that paid such bribes would rapidly become known as suckers and attractive targets for plaintiffs=
lawyers, resulting in frequent and expensive demands.  The only rational recourse to such 
demands, as it is to derivative litigation, is resistance.  Thus, the Aunder the radar screen@ argument 
for the significance of the strike suit problem is quite weak.
Let=s take a look at the second claim, that the success rate of derivative litigation was 
disproportionately low compared with all civil litigation.  The numbers do bear this out in 
107
 Cf. Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs= Attorneys= Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1,78 (1991) (AMost observers 
agree that strike suit litigation is relatively uncommon.@)
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percentage terms, but when one looks at the absolute numbers it appears as if litigation in general 
was not a terribly successful plaintiffs= endeavor (in fact it appears that litigation rarely was 
pursued to completion).  Looking solely at jury trials, from 1934 to 1942 (the period under study), 
the number of cases that resulted in victory for the plaintiff after trial ranged from 458 to 609, or 
from .81% to 1.36% of all civil cases.   Those that were settled or discontinued after trial ranged 
from 619 to 1,158, or from 1.57% to 2.06% of all civil cases.  At the same time, verdicts for 
defendants after trial ranged from 295 to 474, or from .50% to 1.00% of the total.  Finally, average 
monetary awards to plaintiffs ranged from $5,407 ($ 59,311) to $7,800 ($101,798), with a mean of 
$6,207 ($79,852).   In light of median incomes at the time, these hardly seem like exorbitant 
judgments.108
There is less complete data available for bench trials that went to completion, but from 
1934 to 1942 the number of completed bench trials ranged from 1,129 to 1,601, or from 2.11 
percent to 4.24 percent.   Finally, the number of trials as a percentage of all cases (without regard to 
disposition) ranged from 1,884 to 2,216, or from 3.51% to 6.44% of all cases on the calendar 
during the year.
Zlinkoff provides some interesting additional analysis.109  Noting both that the vast majority 
of cases never went to trial and the absence of information as to why they were discontinued 
(settlements, etc.), he argues that Ait would seem more proper in evaluating the results of derivative 
suits to consider the figures for the number of suits in which issue was joined and thereafter either 
108
 In 1944, median per capita income in the State of New York for heads of households was roughly $1,072 
($23,276).  This information was obtained from the staff at the United States Census Library.
109
 Zlinkoff, supra note __ at 362.
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the plaintiff or defendant was successful, eliminating actions that were discontinued.@110  Doing so, 
he determines that issue was joined in 171 cases, of which 13 resulted in recoveries, and 93 in 
settlements, with victory for the defendant in only 65 suits.  That is to say, 62% of the suits in 
which issue was joined resulted in stockholder victory.111  These are numbers which hardly suggest 
abusive litigation was prevalent.
Even more interesting are the amounts awarded either upon plaintiffs= victory or settlement, 
which suggest that successful derivative suits did indeed produce substantial damages.  Drawing at 
least in part from cases in which he was involved, Zlinkoff shows us damages in seven cases from 
1935 to 1944 ranging between $350,000 ($3,555,650 in 2002) to $4,000,000 ($43,877,200 in 
2002) with a mean of $1,665,771 ($20,261,105 in 2002) and a median of $1,800,000  ($21,893,760 
in 2002).112  While these may seem modest in light of contemporary judgments (at least in part, one 
suspects, because corporations were relatively smaller),113 they hardly seem out of line with the 
legal fees of which Wood bitterly complains.  Reporting fees in twelve derivative suits (which are 
not, regrettably, the same cases reported by Zlinkoff but which do cover roughly the same period), 
we see individual defendants= legal fees ranging from $4,890 ( $62,009 in 2002) to $135,000 
($1,676,241 in 2002) with a mean of $ 38,178  ($464,627 in 2002) and a median of $16,000  
110 Id. at 362.
111 Id. at ___.
112
 Zlinkoff, supra note __ at 362 -63..
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 For confirmation see Shiller, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE; Lawrence E. Mitchell, CORPORATE 
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($194,611 in 2002).114  I should also point out that the $135,000 fee was highly aberrant C the next 
largest fee was $71,490 ($ 869,547) with only two more fees over $50,000, two in the low 
$30,000s, and the rest in the teens and below.  Unfortunately Wood does not give the disposition of 
any of these actions. However, these fees hardly seem disproportionate to the amounts of the 
judgments noted by Zlinkoff and one could see them as a relatively low price to pay to enforce 
fiduciary obligations, especially in light of the crisis precipitated by corporate America in the 
1920s.115  Thus, when more data is introduced and Wood=s is carefully analyzed in context,  it is 
hard to see derivative suits as the scourge the Wood Report makes them out to be.
Now if nothing else is clear, it should be clear that the derivative suit was relatively rarely 
brought and that it was very unlikely to have been used as a holdup device. When it was brought, it 
was hardly extraordinarily frequent compared to other terms of litigation, and in fact fares rather 
well against the data for all cases. And fees, while substantial, seem in line with judgments, 
especially when one considers that the fees are for multiple defendants.   Why then, one may ask, 
the hysteria that led to invective and the desire to prohibit derivative suits outright?
Let=s pause before going on to the last two possibilities I mentioned earlier.  For you may 
well have detected a deficiency in my reporting. Combining the above data on the number and 
practice-types of Jewish lawyers in the New York bar with this report on litigation success rates, 
one might conclude that all types of lawsuits suffered from the same level of abuse that derivative 
litigation did, and wonder why the Chamber of Commerce or other groups didn=t try to cut back on 
114
 Wood, supra note __ at 8. 
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 Hornstein gives the counsel fees awarded plaintiffs in 12 derivative actions between 1932 and 1939, 
noting the ratios of fees to amounts awarded to the successful corporation.  The median is 31%, with a mean of 30%. 
George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders= Derivative Suits, 34 Column. L. Rev. 784, 814 (1939).
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the ability to bring law suits in general. After all, as I noted earlier, the elite bar had been 
contemptuous of Jewish lawyers and their practice generally for several decades prior to this.116
Conversely, one might wonder why I am attributing antisemitic motives to the drive to stop 
derivative litigation and not other forms of litigation.
The answer begins to reveal itself when one looks at the practice areas in which  the Jewish 
bar was involved.  As I reported above, the overwhelming number of Jewish lawyers represented 
small merchants or individual clients.  Fagen reports that 42% of Jewish lawyers represented 
Amerchants@.117 The next largest proportion, 25%, represented a Ageneral@ clientele, and following 
that, 14% reported representing corporations118 and 8.5% reported representing Awage earners and 
small shopkeepers.@  Fields of representation for Jewish lawyers fall off significantly, 
proportionally in the single digits, from that point.  Carlin tells us that 70% of New York lawyers 
reported deriving at least 50% of their income from business clients, but that Amost@ lawyers 
representing corporations worked for closely held corporations.119  In addition, while large firms 
reported 68% of their practice as involving business, small firms and sole practitioners, where 
Jewish lawyers typically were found, reported 27% and 36% of their practice as involving 
business.   Moreover, only 14% of large firms and 34% of medium firms (which we have already 
116
 Auerbach, supra note __ at 71-2, 99-100 -101
117
 Fagen, supra note __ at 99. (I have extracted the proportions from the raw data provided in Fagen=s 
tables.)
118
 Recall that Jewish corporations generally were involved in the retail and wholesale trades, soft goods, 
entertainment and communication.  It is possible that some proportion of these 419 Jewish corporate lawyers 
represented WASP corporations, but in light of the available evidence, hardly likely. See Baltzell, supra note ___. 
Moreover, in light of Carlin=s data that most Jews represented closely-held corporations, the likelihood that they 
would have represented major corporations seems even less.
119Carlin, supra at 13.
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seen were largely WASP) reported having a Amainly Jewish@ individual clientele, whereas 46% of 
firms of two to four lawyers and 44% of sole practitioners reported having Amainly Jewish@
individual clients.120   In light of the practice of firms (including large firms) representing the 
individual affairs of their business clients, and in light of the types of businesses Jews engaged 
in121, one can infer, without too much difficulty, that much of the litigation that took place in New 
York courts took place between individuals or small businessmen, largely Jewish and represented 
by Jewish firms on both sides, such that WASP lawyers would be unlikely either to notice or to 
care.
However, it is the large WASP firm that represented large, publicly-held corporate clients,
the very types of businesses that were likely to be targets of stockholder derivative suits. It is a 
reasonable inference, although admittedly an inference, that these firms and their clients would be 
far more aware of the perils of derivative litigation than of the lawsuits among the unwashed 
masses that took up the rest of the trial calendars.  Thus it would be natural for Wood to ignore 
120Carlin, supra note __ at 24.
121
 Baltzell, supra note __ at 207-8, notes that Athe Protestant establishment@ in the 1920s and thereafter 
dominated Aheavy manufacturing, railroad transportation and public utilities . . . (along with commercial banking and 
insurance)@ while Jews were engaged in soft goods, retail and wholesale business, and entertainment and 
communication business.  The German Jewish aristocracy, principally involved in finance but with interests branching 
into railroads and mining, were exceptional.  Birmingham, supra note ___.
It is especially interesting to note WASP dominance in major industry in the 1920s for, as I shall discuss 
infra, it was these industries in which the principal abuses that led to the 1929 Crash, the Pecora investigations, and 
passage of  the securities laws of the 1930s, occurred.  Thus the WASP suspicion of plaintiffs= lawyers (and the 
continuing contemporary suspicion of plaintiffs but not defendants) seems wholly unwarranted and, in the earlier 
period, can likely only be explained in terms of class which, given the structure of the bar, meant race.
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other types of litigation in his study.122  Had he not done so, his case, already weak when examined 
in detail,  would seem to have fallen apart solely on the numbers.
In order to cross-check these inferences, I looked at every derivative suit case in the First 
Department of New York reported between 1920 and 1944.123  Using the admittedly unscientific 
(but unavoidable) technique of identifying ethnicity by surname, I found of the 64 opinions (out of 
74) in which counsels= names appear, that 37 involved Jewish lawyers opposing non-Jewish 
lawyers, 13 involved Jewish lawyers on both sides, and 13 involved non-Jewish lawyers on both 
sides, with one in which there was a substantial mix of ethnicity on both sides. While hardly 
conclusive (and while it has never been my claim that derivative litigation was the exclusive 
province of Jewish lawyers), the fact that 50% of the cases involved Jews against non-Jews, and 
another 17% involved Jews alone, for a total of 67% of the derivative suit cases brought by Jewish 
lawyers, seems to provide good support for my conclusion.  This of course says nothing about the 
ethnicity of the management of the defendant corporations, although, as we saw above, most large 
firms did not represent a Jewish clientele, and Jewish businesses were rather limited in type and 
nature.124
122
 One might expect small practice Jewish lawyers to have heavily engaged in personal injury litigation, 
often against WASP-controlled insurance companies, and that this too would be viewed with offense by the WASP 
establishment. Note first that it is virtually impossible to bring a personal injury Astrike suit.@ Typically the injury will 
be apparent. Moreover, a random sampling of 200 personal injury cases between 1900 and 1945 revealed obviously 
Jewish lawyers in fewer than 10% of cases, although Jews did appear most often for the plaintiff.
123
 Obviously this is a flawed enterprise in light of the relatively small number of derivative suit cases that 
reached trial and as to which an opinion was written, but it is the best I can do on the data available.
124
 In addition to the evidence already presented, see Abraham K. Korman, THE OUTSIDERS: JEWS AND 
CORPORATE AMERICA (1988) (evaluating the absence of Jews from the managerial ranks of most established 
corporations and their relatively greater presence in entrepreneurial corporations and the professions.)
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The truth of the conclusion that the push to restrict derivative litigation was motivated by 
antisemitism is poignantly brought home by an article published in the Michigan Law Review in 
1937 by Harris Berlack, a Jewish member of the New York bar.125  The article begins by 
acknowledging both the paucity of studies of the methods of enforcing shareholders= rights and the 
general disrepute in which the derivative suit was held,  despite the fact that it was the only 
significant process available for the enforcement of those rights. As Berlack puts it: Athe 
stockholders= suit is universally reviled.@126 Why?  Not because it was easy for plaintiffs.  Berlack 
discusses the hurdles faced by a stockholder plaintiff and his lawyer, detailing the expense, risk, 
and difficulty of succeeding.  Having done so, he then comes to the point which, while coded, 
smacks undeniably of the taint of antisemitism underlying the Auniversal@ hostility to shareholder 
litigation.  Let me illustrate using Berlack=s own words:
AIn the sort of case under consideration, however, the labor involved is so great and the 
outcome so uncertain that the leaders of the bar are seldom inclined to take the gamble.  This 
leaves the field to the younger and less experienced or to the less successful and sometimes less 
scrupulous members of the profession.  Plaintiffs, as a consequence, find it difficult to obtain 
proper representation; and defendants must oppose tactics which are not always the most ethical, 
or, at the least, are subjected to an attack which is unnecessarily and unpleasantly belligerent.@127
AFor the abuse heaped upon the >strikers= there may be ample justification.  Unfortunately, those 
constantly affiliated with large corporate interests have developed the habit of placing all 
complaining stockholders in the same category.@128
125
  Harris Berlack, Stockholders= Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 Michigan L. Rev. 597 (1937).  One can, as 
I choose to do giving Mr. Berlack the benefit of the doubt, see this piece as poignant.  One can also see it, less 
charitably, as a classic example of Uncle-Tomism. 
126 Id. at 599.
127 Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
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ASo intensified has become the rancor of this attitude, that the upstart who dares to question 
the conduct of corporate affairs is cast outside the pale of common decency.@129
AThe viciousness of such attacks [of plaintiffs and their counsel] militates against their very 
purpose; it insures that stockholders= suits will be instituted and conducted, as a rule, only by those 
who are most impervious to abuse B and hence capable of the most objectionable conduct.@130
There=s more. More is not needed.  We already know who the Aleaders of the bar@ and the 
Aless successful@ lawyers were.  Why should the fact that the latter were the ones willing to take on 
these suits lead to their revilement?  AUnnecessarily and unpleasantly belligerent attacks@?  An 
unpleasantly belligerent nature is one of the classic old antisemitic saws. APlacing all complaining 
stockholders in the same category@?  That sounds awfully like stereotyping, and given the facts as 
we know them, the Acategory@ into which all of these lawyers were put is obvious.  AUpstart@?  Of 
course these would be people who impertinently attempt to rise above their station or interfere with 
the activities of their betters.131 ACast outside the pale@?  The Pale of Settlement (while a borrowed 
term) consisted of the western areas at the edges of Russia in which Jews were permitted to live. 
To be outside the pale was to be completely ostracized.   AThose who are most impervious to 
129 Id. (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
131
  Upstart indeed.  John Higham illustrates this nicely:  AAnd discrimination reflected, as it had for fifty 
years, a conjunction of two factors: the great but insecure inequalities of a middle class society in which men striving 
for distinction feared inundation; and the urgent pressure which the Jews, as an exceptionally ambitious immigrant 
people, put upon some of the more crowded rungs of the social ladder.@ John Higham,. Social Discrimination 
Against Jews in America, 1830-1930, in V THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (Abraham J. Karp, ed., 1969), 349, 
371.  And Higham goes on, describing discrimination in the period immediately before that of the Wood Report as 
caused by Astatus panic@, id., and sees the very success of the Jews as the cause of social antisemitism. AWhereas 
other European groups generally gained respect as assimilation improved their stature, the Jews reaped more and 
more dislike as they bettered themselves,@ id. at 376, and AUnfavorable stereotypes have pictured an overbearing 
Jewish ability to gain advantage in American life.  Only one other important immigrant group B the Japanese B has 
normally been disliked for its strength rather than its weakness.@ Id.  It is the temerity of Jews to challenge their 
betters that led to the Auniversal revilement@ of derivative litigation.
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abuse@?  Why?  Because the contempt in which they are already held makes the marginal pain of 
further abuse insignificant, especially for the starving lawyer trying to make a living.  
The coding is thin.  Mr. Berlack, a Jew and New York plaintiffs= lawyer, does not want to 
be tarred with the same brush as his colleagues, and uses the very language of coded antisemitism 
to protest his own innocence. Combined with Berlack=s (perhaps unintentional) self-revelation, the 
rhetoric of the Wood Report tells us exactly why derivative suits were considered to be such a 
significant problem, despite the reality of their relative innocence and the lack of serious scholarly 
concern with the issue.  That reason is the irritation and vexation felt by WASP lawyers and their 
WASP clients at having to defend themselves against the annoying and decidedly low life Aupstart@
Jews who were demanding an equality which the WASP aristocracy was unwilling to grant them.  
It is counterfactual, but had the challenge of derivative litigation come from WASP B or at least 
Christian B  lawyers, the empirical evidence suggests that there=s a least a good chance that 
derivative litigation would not have been so Auniversally despised@ and that any problems could 
have been worked out through a Agentleman=s agreement.@132  Recall the substantially better 
educational opportunities for low status Protestants and the equivalent career opportunities for law 
achieving Protestants compared with high achieving Jews.133  And it=s not just the empirical 
evidence. 
132
  Or it could have been that poorer relation WASP lawyers would have been reluctant to take on such 
suits because they had a very real opportunity to rise in status within the bar, an opportunity not available to Jewish 
lawyers.
133
 See note  and  and accompanying text.
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I recall beginning my career at a large, Awhite-shoe@ New York law firm in 1981.134  During 
my first year, I was taken under the wing of one of the senior (WASP) partners and taught to do an 
initial public offering.  We spent a great deal of time together, both in the office and traveling back 
and forth to our client in Boston.  As we were sitting alone in a Boston restaurant one night, well 
into the transaction and thus our relationship (and well into a couple of drinks) this partner paused, 
looked at me, and, smilingly said: AMitchell, I like you. You can=t be Jewish. You=ve got to be 
Irish.@135  Irish B although almost assuredly Catholic B would have been all right.  Jewish simply 
was unacceptable.
The kind of discrimination that led to the Wood Report could well have been overt and 
intentional, or it could have been, and likely was, more subtle.  Laura Z. Hobson=s wonderful 
period novel, Gentleman=s Agreement, 136 describes antisemitism in New York among Athe better 
sort@ at the height of its American rise, the 1940s.  Dramatizing the same psychological forces that 
Charles Lawrence describes as unconscious racism, 137 Hobson shows the socially unacceptable 
status of even assimilated Eastern European Jews, and the psychologically subtle, subconscious 
defenses for discriminatory practice even among those horrified to be called antisemitic, as well as 
134
 Not Paul Weiss which I mentioned supra at note __, and to which I later went.
135
 Of course that was the day I decided to leave the firm.  To be fair, this partner clearly liked me and gave 
me wonderful references for subsequent jobs.  The simple fact (and pain) of the antidote is that he (coincidentally,  a 
Bronxville resident) had trouble coming to grips with the fact that he so liked a Jew.
136
 Laura Z. Hobson, GENTLEMAN=S AGREEMENT (1946).   The novel was made into an Academy Award 
winning movie starring Gregory Peck, Celeste Holm, and John Garfield.
137
 Lawrence, supra note __.
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the kind of pain it inflicted, the very kind of pain that could well have led to Mr. Berlack=s pleas of 
difference.138
A 1955 article in Look magazine, entitled The Position of the Jews in America Today, 
pretty much sums things up.139  The author, highly sympathetic to American Jews and critical of 
antisemitism, could still ask such questions, revealing ancient antisemitic allegations, as AWhy are 
there so many Jewish organizations?@ (evidently forgetting Tocqueville=s description of America as 
a society of organizations), and AWhat makes Jews so clannish?@  He could still make such 
affirmative statements as AJews do tend to be clannish . . . .@, AFor centuries, the Jews were misfits . 
. .@, Asome Jews . . . tend to be over aggressive@, Aa great many are hypersensitive in their relations 
with Gentiles@ and, perhaps most astonishing of all and apparently as evidence of this last 
statement, AThey seem to have a special exposed nerve that registers every tremor of prejudice like 
a seismograph: Let a Gentile use an idiomatic phrase like >He jewed me down,= and every Jew 
within earshot will mark him as a bigot.@140
More objectively, the author could point out the continued discrimination against Jewish 
students in Athe majority@ of fraternities and sororities, quotas at medical schools and virtual 
exclusion from engineering schools, the substantial persistence of overt employment 
138
 For an earlier and cruder depiction of the exclusion of even upper-class Jewry in the character of the 
Princeton- educated Robert Cohn, see Ernest Hemingway, THE SUN ALSO RISES (1926).
139
 Recall that this is five years before the data reported by Carlin. William Attwood, The Position of the 
Jews in America Today, 19 Look, No. 24, November 29, 1955. 
140
 It is worth noting that language, even metaphorical, that describes Jews as having a Aspecial exposed 
nerve@ reinforces the idea of antisemitism as rooted in race or biology.
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discrimination against Jews, and the fact that, Aamong real estate brokers in certain areas, there is a 
tacit agreement not to sell to Jews.@
It=s hard to prove crude antisemitism as the cause of any discrimination against Jews, and 
Hobson illustrates this nicely in her book (although the author of the Look article unintentionally 
does a good job).  Few people of the level of sophistication and education that characterized the  
eastern WASP upper classes would have been so ill-mannered as to proclaim outright their dislike 
of Jews and their attribution to Jews of unpleasant characteristics. (One of the ironies in Hobson=s 
novel is that the protagonist, Phil Green, is a Stanford-educated, California-raised WASP reporter 
who poses as a Jew in New York society for the purpose of understanding, and writing about, 
antisemitism.  He is tarred with precisely the same brush, and has precisely the same characteristics 
attributed to him,  as other AJews@, simply as a result of identifying himself as Jewish.)  It was the 
Jewishness of the plaintiff=s bar that caused the derivative suit to assume crisis proportions among 
the WASP corporate and legal elite.
Waste or Class?
The second two reasons in defense of section 61-b, that derivative suits generally were 
meretricious and that recovery was so de minimus as to make them a waste of time, fall on the 
explanation I gave earlier.  While I have not read every derivative suit opinion from this period, the 
data seem clear that derivative suits did not deviate terribly significantly from the norm for 
plaintiffs= litigation, rendering both of these explanations implausible.
There is one other possible argument that transcends antisemitism as an explanation for 
why derivative suits were viewed as so threatening, an argument that is highlighted by Carlin=s 
conclusions that ethical behavior was a function of bar status.  That is to suggest that the animosity 
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was less driven by hatred of Jews than by class differences.  But this answer is difficult, if 
impossible, to sustain.  Were it the case that the plaintiffs= bar was made up largely of Irish and 
Italian lawyers, the class story might be plausible.  But it wasn=t.  And so the argument has the 
initial weakness of being entirely counterfactual. Of course there was elite discrimination against 
these ethnic groups. But not only did it never come close to reaching the extent of antisemitism;141
they were ethnic groups that were themselves participants in the virulent antisemitism that was 
pervasive during the era of the Wood Report and, for the most part at that time had their own 
defined economic roles in the trades, the police, politics, civil service, and shopkeeping which, 
while somewhat humble, were never the province of the Protestant elite.142  More important, if 
class were the issue, then it should have been the case that lower-class Protestant lawyers were 
treated as poorly as Jewish lawyers, from their matriculation into college until their admission to 
the bar and employment in firms. But the evidence we=ve already examined suggests just the 
opposite.  Lower-class Protestants, and particularly academically unsuccessful lower class 
Protestants, had almost the same chances to attain elite legal status as did wealthy and 
academically successful Jews, whereas poor and academically unsuccessful Jews had almost no 
chance at all. Finally, it is worth repeating that, as Baltzell sees it, the WASP elite largely defined 
itself in opposition to Eastern European Jewry to a far greater extent than the negligible notice 
taken of other ethnic minorities.  The class argument falls apart on the facts.143
141
 John Higham, Social Discrimination Against Jews in America, 1830-1930, in V THE JEWISH 
EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (Abraham J. Karp, ed., 1969), 349, 375-6. 
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 The Irish control of New York City politics through the Tammany machine, from the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century until the Second World War, is well known. Howe, supra note __ at 363.
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 Of course it is well-known that public mistrust of lawyers in general, and especially plaintiffs= lawyers, 
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Just Who Can You Trust These Days ? 
It seems obvious from the tone of the Wood Report and its conclusions that the Jewish 
plaintiffs= bar was completely distrusted by elite lawyers.  The general environment of the New 
York bar, the more broadly national discussions of ethics codes144 and practices that tended to 
disparage and show distrust of plaintiffs= lawyers in general, and the ways in which those ethics 
rules did their best to limit the business of Jewish lawyers, further support this conclusion.  Section 
61-b was designed precisely on the basis of that mistrust.  The Wood Report=s implicit, and 
sometimes explicit, argument is that grasping and unscrupulous (Jewish)  plaintiffs= lawyers were 
threatening the health of corporate America, a corporate America run by Athe best men@ society 
could produce.145
In light of that, it is worth asking whether the evidence supports greater trustworthiness in 
corporate America than in the plaintiffs= bar.  Fortunately, we have both contemporaneous and 
then-relatively recent historical evidence to draw upon in assessing this question.
Two famous pieces of literature present themselves.  The first, because roughly 
contemporaneous with these attitudes towards plaintiffs= lawyers and published not all that long 
before 61-b was enacted, is the Pecora Report which  investigated the banking and securities 
industry abuses of the 1920s which contributed to the Crash of >29 and the Great Depression. (We 
stretches far back into history and well before the history with which this article is concerned.  However, the 
confluence of mistrust of lawyers and mistrust of Jews appears to have morphed into the antisemitic impulses of the 
bar. Marc Galanter points out that AA large portion of the [lawyer] jokes in the betrayal cluster are adapted from 
jokes that were predominantly told about Jews.@  Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers In 
Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 805, 827 (1998).
144Auerbach, supra note __ at Chapter Two.
145John Sproat, THE BEST MEN: LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED AGE (1968); E. Merrick Dodd, For 
Whom are Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932).
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also have the benefit of a 1939 book written by Ferdinand Pecora, analyzing the extent to which 
corporate America had failed to reform in the wake of those hearings and the resultant enactment 
of the federal securities laws.)146
The second is the earlier report of the Pujo Commission147 following the Panic of 1907 
which led to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and the Clayton Act.148  The work of the Pujo 
Commission revealed a web of central and highly concentrated power over American industry by a 
small group of men, specifically in the American (WASP-dominated and WASP-represented) 
finance industry.
It might be worth beginning by quoting the words of Ferdinand Pecora in his 1939 
assessment of the success of the securities laws in curbing corporate abuses:
Under the surface of the governmental regulation of the securities market, the same forces 
that produced the riotous speculative excesses of the Awild bull market@ of 1929 still give 
evidences of their existence and influence.  Though repressed for the present, it cannot be doubted 
that, given a suitable opportunity, they would spring back into pernicious activity.
Frequently we are told that this regulation has been throttling the country=s prosperity.  
Bitterly hostile was Wall Street to the enactment of the regulatory legislation.  It now looks 
forward to the day when it shall, as it hopes, reassume the reins of its former power.
That its leaders are eminently fitted to guide our nation, and that they would make a much 
better job of it than any other body of men, Wall Street does not for a moment doubt.  Indeed, if 
you now hearken to the oracles of The Street, you will hear now and then that the money-changers 
146Pecora Report; Ferdinand Pecora, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY 
CHANGERS (1939). From January, 1933 to July, 1934, Pecora was counsel to the United States Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency which conducted the investigation.
147Money Trust Investigation: Investigation of Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States 
under House Resolutions Nos. 429 and 504 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency: 
Interlocking Directorates (1913). The Pujo Commission is named after Louisiana congressman Arsene Pujo who 
was chair of the subcommittee.
148
 12 USCS ' 226 (2002)
    15 USCS ' 12 (2002)
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have been much maligned.  You will be told that a whole group of high-minded men, innocent of 
social or economic wrongdoing, were expelled from the temple because of the excesses of a few. . . 
These disingenuous protestations are, in the crisp legal phrase, without merit.  The case 
against the money- changers does not rest upon hearsay or surmise.  It is based upon a mass of 
evidence, given publicly and under oath before the Banking and Currency Committee of the United 
States Senate in 1933-1934, by The Street=s mightiest and best-informed men. Their testimony is 
recorded in twelve thousand printed pages . . . .
The public, however, is sometimes forgetful.149
Granted that Pecora had a legacy to protect, the evidence assembled by the Commission 
was overwhelming.  Wall Street simply was not to be trusted.  And Wall Street controlled 
corporate America.
The same conclusions are even clearer in the Pujo Commission report, which includes 
elaborate tables detailing the extent to which major financial institutions had interlocking 
directorates across the scope of corporate America.   To quote a summary of the report=s findings:
The firm members and directors whose affiliations are thus shown number 180.  In the 
aggregate they hold 385 directorships in 41 banks and trust companies . . .50 directorships in 11 
insurance companies . . .155 directorships in 31 railroad systems . . . 6 directorships in 2 express 
companies and 4 directorships in 1 steamship company . . .98 directorships in 28 producing and 
trading corporations . . . and 48 directorships in 19 public utility corporations . . . in all, 746 
directorships in 134 corporations having total resources or capitalization of $25,325,000,000.150
By itself, the fact that a small group of men in the American financial industry controlled 
all other major industries doesn=t mean they were untrustworthy. It does suggest, however, that 
nobody was watching them but themselves.  If nothing else, this should underscore the need for 
some kind of watchdog, and the only available one at the time was the plaintiffs= lawyer acting as 
private attorney general. Even after the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Act, the 
149
 Pecora, WALL STREET, supra note _- at ix- x.
150
 Pujo Report supra note __ at Exhibit 134-C 
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Glass-Steagall Act, and the securities laws, significant corporate abuses continued as Pecora 
reports.151
So why trust corporate managers? They=d already let America down in very significant 
ways B twice in twenty years.152  And, as I noted above, derivative litigation was a very small part 
of judicial business and the securities class action hadn=t even been invented yet. What reason did 
the New York elite bar, Chamber of Commerce, and legislature have to assume that plaintiffs=
lawyers were generally less trustworthy than corporate managers?  It would appear that they had 
none, except the deep mistrust of the mostly Jewish plaintiffs= bar which went with American 
antisemitism in general.
It isn=t quite so easy just to leave things at this point though.  As I noted earlier, the purpose 
of the Carlin report was to examine the ethical behavior of New York lawyers. We=ve already seen 
the stratification of the bar which remained consistent between 1939 and Carlin=s work.  Carlin 
concludes in his study that understanding the stratification of the bar is Aessential@ to understanding 
the forces that determine lawyers= ethical behavior.153
Here Jewish lawyers fared less well.  Carlin concludes that in general large firm lawyers 
whom, as we have seen, were mostly WASP, were more likely to conform to explicit ethical norms 
than smaller firm lawyers whom we have seen were more likely to be Jewish.  From this one might 
151
 Pecora, supra note __ .
152
 Actually financial panics were far more frequent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
occurring at least in 1837, 1857, 1873, 1903, and 1907. 
153
 Carlin, supra note __ at 23.
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conclude that it was indeed rational to distrust the plaintiffs= bar. But not so fast.  For Carlin 
concludes:
Viewed alone, . . . [the data] suggests a direct connection between cultural or religious 
characteristics and conformity with ethical norms.  However, further analysis of the data indicates 
that the significance of ethnicity is largely confined to the role it plays in allocating lawyers to 
different status positions in the bar and in exposing them to different pressures.154
In other words, Carlin found that when lawyers of different ethnicity were of equal status in the 
bar, ethnicity was Avirtually eliminated@ as a factor in ethical compliance.155  The extent that Jewish 
lawyers were more likely to violate explicit ethical norms than Protestant lawyers is a clear 
function of the stratification of the bar based on antisemitism.   
Even if Jews were more likely to violate explicit ethical norms, can we conclude that they 
were intrinsically less trustworthy?   Two other aspects of the ethical dimension suggest not, and 
further suggest that their ethical violations were for the most part far more innocuous than the 
social and economic damage wrought by corporate managers and their counsel.  The first aspect is 
the type of ethical rules that lower-status lawyers tended to violate, none of which go the issues 
raised in the Wood Report nor are likely to be relevant in a sophisticated, large firm corporate 
practice.  The second is the fact that the ethics rules themselves were drafted on a rather explicit 
background of antisemitism, and that many of the rules (such as the prohibition on advertising) 
were explicitly designed to damage the prospects of Jewish lawyers and thereby discourage them 
from becoming members of the bar in the first place.
154
 Carlin, supra note __ at 126.
155 Carlin, supra note __ at 126.
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First let=s look at the types of ethical violations used in the study.  Before doing so, it is 
worth remembering that the ethics rules we are dealing with are not rules of morality, but are 
instead positive rules that were constructed and adopted by the bar. As every law student comes to 
understand, the ethics rules are even sometimes counterintuitive, and are designed to permit 
consistent self-regulation of the bar.  As I=ll shortly describe, some of the ethical violations Carlin 
uses are clearly wrong and indefensible under any system of ethics. Others are more ambiguous, 
obviously arising from the need to make a living under the circumstances I earlier described. Still 
others have little if any moral content (like the prohibition on advertising) and may themselves 
derive from wrongful policies, like creating barriers to entry to prevent excessive competition.
I lack the space to explain in detail all of Carlin=s categories,156 but a brief listing of them 
should at least indicate the nature of the violations.  Recited like the ten plagues visited upon Egypt 
at the Passover Seder, they are: kickbacks to clients for referral of other clients, conflicts of 
interest, purchasing stock in a corporation to which the assets of a bankrupt client corporation are 
to be transferred, sending Christmas cards to all clients, overlooking a client=s bribe of a tax or 
other governmental official, accepting ordinary commissions from title insurance companies 
without informing the client, recommending an Aalmost fair@ settlement offer to client in exchange 
for future concessions from the insurance adjuster, accepting a referral fee from another lawyer, 
misinforming client as to the weakness of the state=s case against him to ensure continued 
installments on fees, agreeing to take divorce case where parties agree to consent decree on the 
basis of adultery although no adultery was committed (adultery being the only ground for divorce 
in New York),  following client=s instructions to disregard oral agreement with other lawyer in 
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order to take a better deal, bribing police to get charge of homosexuality against Apromising youth@
removed from records, and insider trading.157
As one can readily see, some of the actions that are considered violations (having the 
records purged of charges of a dubious crime for a Apromising youth@, referral fees, the divorce 
consent decree, and sending Christmas cards to clients) are at least morally defensible.  Some of 
these are also based on ethical restrictions that are downright anticompetitive (referral fees, 
Christmas cards).  Others, while violations of a client=s trust, are not seriously wrongful (accepting 
a normal title insurance commission without disclosure).  Most of the others are unambiguously 
wrong, but one can see their clear relationship to a lawyers= ability to survive. One can also see that 
the situations in which most of these violations occur wouldn=t even come up in the large firm 
corporate context. And it should be quite clear that none of these violations relate to the kinds of 
issues that come up in derivative litigation.  Thus the implication that corporate managers are 
somehow more trustworthy than plaintiffs= lawyers seems to fail, especially when the serious 
national economic damage those corporate managers caused during the first thirty years of the 
previous century and the beginning of this one is compared with the relatively petty nature of most 
of the ethical offenses identified above.  
Class Actions
The second type of stockholder litigation which has been subjected to significant 
restrictions is that under the federal securities laws and, most importantly, section 10(b) and rule 
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The reason for discussing class actions, despite the 
156
 Carlin, supra note __ at 44-5 explains them in detail.
157
 Carlin at 44-5.
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fact that all of the hard evidence relates to derivative suits, is because class actions effectively 
supplanted derivative suits as the principle means by which stockholders seek redress.  As such, 
they have been subject to the same opprobrium as derivative suits, and indeed it is class action 
suits which were the target of the 1995 Act.  
As with derivative litigation, the issue on which I=d like to focus is standing to sue (the 
securities for expense statute can be seen as a standing matter since a plaintiff who fails to comply 
loses his standing to sue.)  Under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, it is unlawful for any person Ato use 
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance@ that contravenes SEC rules (rule 10b-5 being the operational 
rule).  Prior to 1975, the federal courts, principally the Second Circuit where most securities 
litigation took place, and the Supreme Court, had been struggling to flesh out the meaning of this 
rather cryptic enabling statute (and the equally cryptic rule.)  Both courts, however, were guided by 
the general policy that since the securities acts were remedial in nature, they were to be liberally 
interpreted.  In general, although the courts did impose reasonable restrictions, it=s fair to say that 
they were in fact liberally interpreted.
From 1975 on, it=s equally fair to say that the Supreme Courts= securities jurisprudence has 
been an aggressive and unprincipled cutting back on plaintiffs= rights under the securities laws.  
The landmark case (symbolizing the real start of the cutback) was Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores158 in which then-Justice Rehnquist, in his only securities law opinion, wrote an 
incoherent opinion (based on none of the briefs in the case) largely turning on the fear of 
158
 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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Avexatious litigation@, a phrase that rings with the tones of distrust we=ve been following through 
the second part of the twentieth century.159
Following Blue Chip were cases in which the Court limited defendants= liability under the 
>33 Act by, among other things, defining a Aprospectus@ (as to which legal action could be taken) as 
not a prospectus, limiting the statute of limitations under the antifraud rules of the >34 Act to a total 
of three years from the fraud (regardless of the fact that the essence of fraud is concealment and it 
is more than possible to take longer than three years to uncover a business fraud), eliminating 
liability for misleading proxy statements if the proxy statement was sent voluntarily by the 
company rather than legally mandated, and eliminating aiding and abetting liability under the >34 
Act antifraud provisions (which was the principal way plaintiffs were able to hold lawyers and 
accountants liable for fraud under the Act, a questionable move at the time and one made even 
more so by the Enron debacle). 160
The low point of the cutback was, however, brought to us by Congress, in its passage of 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  While there are many aspects of that statute 
to criticize, including procedural devices to restrict the number of plaintiffs= firms that can bring 
suit, the most troubling aspects of the statute are a heightened state of mind requirement (plaintiff 
must prove that defendant knew of the fraud instead of the earlier mere recklessness, surely a very 
difficult task in most cases), the elimination of joint and several liability by the apportionment of 
159
 It is worth recalling that one issue that arose during Rehnquists= confirmation hearing was his ownership 
of property, the deed of which contained a restrictive covenant against sales to Jews.  At the very least this suggests 
gross insensitivity.
160 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, No Business Like No Business, in THE REHNQUIST COURT, (Herman 
Schwartz, ed. forthcoming 2002) for a discussion of these cases.
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fault with a corresponding  limitation on damages (thus further creating financial disincentives for 
plaintiffs to sue), unusually burdensome pleading requirements (almost impossible to meet before 
discovery), and protection from the antifraud rules for forward - looking statements by a 
corporation as long as the statement is qualified by a phrase suggesting that it be taken with a grain 
of salt (hardly a difficult task for corporations to meet and protecting misleading statements 
completely.)161
I=m not going to claim that this Act, like the New York statute, was proximately caused by 
antisemitism. Both the demographics of the bar and our social norms have changed far too 
dramatically to make that assertion sustainable.  But there are some interesting aspects of the Act 
and its passage which suggest that the attitudes which prompted it are not far removed from the 
antisemitism that led to section 61-b.
The 1995 Act was a legacy of the Contract with America, the brainchild of  Newt Gingrich 
in his attempt to take over the House of Representatives during the 1994 mid-term elections. 
Among the actions under the Contract promised by its signatories within the first 100 days of the 
104th Congress was the so-called ACommon Sense Legal Reform Act@, which included both reform 
of products liability litigation and the 1995 Act.  Products liability litigation reform, while it 
initially passed, could not override the President=s veto.  The 1995 Act passed, overriding President 
Clinton=s veto, on a vote of 68-30 in the Senate (with 20 Democrats voting in favor) and 319-100-1 
in the House (with 89 Democrats voting in favor).  Particularly unusual, as I earlier mentioned, is 
that a review of the legislative history of the 1995 Act reveals virtually no empirical evidence as to 
the losses (including virtually no evidence of the loss to corporate productivity), if any, caused by 
161
 P.L. 104-67 (1995).
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stockholder litigation, and absolutely no empirical evidence as to the benefits.162  Of course there 
are strike suits, and limitations on them are important.  But there is no hard evidence that the 
limitations in this act were anything but overkill.  Why did such a poorly conceived bill pass, and 
why this and not products liability legislation as well?163
For one thing, the 1995 Act was at least in large part passed because of the enormous 
lobbying pressure brought to bear on Congress by Silicon Valley corporations, corporations the 
stock volatility and failure rate of which was much higher than the norm and the executives of 
which wanted protection from lawsuits filed every time their stock price dropped ten percent. But 
this can=t be the entire explanation, for high tech corporations are geographically concentrated and 
corporations subject to products liability suits are located throughout the country. It should have 
been the case, then, that Congress was subject to at least as much pressure (or at least pressure 
more broadly felt) in the products liability area than in the securities area.164
Another possibility is that personal injury plaintiffs= lawyers also are located throughout the 
United States, whereas stockholders= plaintiffs= lawyers are concentrated in a very few cities, 
especially in the northeast and most particularly in New York where the acknowledged principal 
target of the legislation, the largely Jewish Milberg, Weiss, has its main office.  Most 
162Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Dav. L. Rev. 903 at n. 57.
163
 It is important to remember that both pieces of legislation were part of the Republican Contract with 
America, a House-generated document, and to note that not a single House Republican voted against the override of 
the President=s veto of the 1995 Act. (A very few Senate Republicans voted against the override.)
Also note that while the House mustered 319 votes to override the President=s veto of the 1995 Act, only 
258 votes were cast in the House to override the veto of the products liability reform act.  This removed almost all 
Democrats from the override, leaving it to the House Republicans whose public commitment it was to pass that act.
164
 Of course it=s possible the high tech industry was better organized, and that it also spread its campaign 
largess over a far broader sweep than Northern California.
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congresspeople would have very little concern with such a localized interest group, where they 
would be much more concerned with the kinds of lawyers that practiced in their own districts.
So simple public choice explanations could suffice.
But the rush to legislate on this subject, and the contempt for plaintiffs= lawyers obvious in 
the hearings records, suggests another possibility. Not explicit antisemitism. But perhaps an 
attitude, the origins of which would not likely have been visible to Congress, an attitude arising in 
the very antisemitism that led to section 61-b.165
Racism? Not necessarily.  Jody Armour has made the interesting argument that stereotypes 
persist even in the minds of low - prejudiced people long after prejudice itself is gone.166  And to 
read the record of the hearings is to see the repeated stereotype of the grasping, unscrupulous 
plaintiffs= lawyer. If this is the case, at least with respect to most of those who voted in favor of the 
bill (for, as I noted, they had almost no hard information on which to vote), it is less troubling than 
is the passage of Section 61-b, but does call for a conscious examination of the origins of these 
stereotypes and, as we can see with respect to the 1995 Act, it leads us to reactive rather than 
considered public policy.  So stereotypes, even deracinated ones, are harmful enough.
But was there no antisemitism?  The repeated litany of the Jewish names of the members of 
the plaintiffs= securities bar at least raises a question, at least with respect to some congresspeople 
(I have nobody particular in mind.)  Racism can be unconscious.  It can be conscious.  But 
conscious or unconscious, it is beyond dispute that the burden of the 1995 Act fell quite 
165
 It is interesting to note that Senator Boxer, a Jew from Northern California where Silicon Valley is 
located, voted neither for the original bill nor the override, presumably at some political peril from her wealthy 
constituents who were lobbying so vociferously for its passage.
166
 Armour, supra note __.
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disproportionately upon urban, and especially New York, Jewish lawyers.  The echoes of 1944 
should at least make us stop and think.
Appendix A
Jewish Census Information
Demographics in 19371
Jewish Population 
Estimate (American 
Jewish Yearbook 
1937)2
General Population3
(American Jewish 
Yearbook 1937)
Percent Jewish
Manhattan 351,037 1,870,225 18.77%
Brooklyn 974,765 2,630,456 37.06%
Bronx 592,185 1,349,621 43.88%
Queens 107,855 1,227,659 8.79%
Richmond (Later 
Staten Island)
9,158 167,354 5.47%
Total New York City 2,035,000 7,245,315 28.09%
1
 Jacob Rader Marcus has done extensive research on the Jewish people in America.  Among his research 
data, he has found data on populations of Jews in various cities in the United States.  See Marcus, Jacob Rader:  TO 
COUNT A PEOPLE:  AMERICAN JEWISH POPULATION DATA, 1585-1984 (University Press of America Boston 1990), 
Page 139 for NY State.
Marcus cites Universal Jewish Encyclopedia in an estimate that 2,100,000 Jews lived in New York City in 1939.  No 
numbers or estimates were available for each of the boroughs for 1939.  However, Marcus cites American Jewish 
Yearbook for 1937 numbers broken down by borough.  For 1940, Marcus cites Horowitz and Kaplan for a borough 
breakdown.  For the number of Jews, the 1940 numbers only add up to 1,784,000 (Marcus citing Horowitz and
Kaplan).  Note that Horowitz and Kaplan were far more conservative on the number of Jews in NYC than AJYB.  
However, both primary sources (AJYB and Horowitz/Kaplan) seem to be experts on Jewish populations in the 
United States, so it is unclear whose numbers would be most accurate.
2
 By backtracking the American Jewish Yearbook=s numbers, it seems that AJYB created its estimates of
the Jewish population using a top down method.  Taking arbitrarily chosen percentages times the total estimated 
number of Jews in New York City (2,035,000), the authors simply allocated the Jews among the five boroughs.  The 
percentages used are as follows:  Manhattan 17.25%, Brooklyn 47.90%, Bronx 29.10%, Queens 5.30%, and 
Richmond (Staten Island) 0.45%.
3 AGeneral Population@, as used in these tables, refers to the population of New York.
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1940 Demographics
Jewish Population 
Estimate 
(Horowitz/Kaplan)
General Population 
(1940 U.S. Census)
Percent Jewish
Manhattan 270,000 1,889,924 14.29%
Brooklyn 857,000 2,698,285 31.76%
Bronx 538,000 1,394,711 38.57%
Queens 115,000 1,297,634 8.86%
Richmond (Later 
Staten Island)
4,000 174,441 2.29%
Total New York City 1,784,000 7,454,995 23.93%
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1960 Demographics1
Population Estimate 
of Jewish People 
(American Jewish 
Yearbook 1960)
General Population 
(1960 U.S. Census)
Percent Jewish
Manhattan 293,000 1,698,281 17.25%
Brooklyn 794,000 2,627,319 30.22%
Bronx 432,000 1,424,815 30.32%
Queens 408,000 1,809,578 22.55%
Richmond (Later 
Staten Island)
10,000 221,991 4.50%
Total New York City 1,937,000 7,781,984 24.89%
1
 For Carlin=s year (1960), much more information was found.  The Marcus data for 1960 cites AJYB, and 
the total population data comes from the U.S. Census taken in 1960.
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Appendix B
Law Schools Attended by Jewish Lawyers1, 1939
Law School Number Percentage
Brooklyn Law School 773 25.8
New York University 679 22.7
New York Law School 364 12.1
Columbia 329 11.0
St. John=s 322 10.7
Fordham 188 6.2
Harvard 122 4.0
Yale 27 0.9
Cornell 23 0.7
Others 48 1.6
Not Indicated 112 3.7
1Fagen at 97. 
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Appendix C
Types of Principal Clients and Median 1939 Incomes of Jewish Lawyers1
Type of Principal 
Clients
Number of 
Lawyers 
Reporting
Percentage of 
Lawyers 
Reporting
Median Income 
(1937 Dollars)
Median 
Income (2002 
Dollars)
Banks 51 1.72% 7,604 97,812.32
Stock Brokers 15 0.51% 5,938 76,382.11
Corporations 419 14.12% 4,968 63,904.74
Theatrical, Radio 16 0.54% 4,333 55,736.56
Trade Associations 13 0.44% 4,250 54,668.91
Trade Unions 23 0.77% 4,000 51,453.09
Insurance 
Companies and 
Brokers
26 0.88% 3,800 48,880.43
Garment Industry 103 3.47% 3,684 47,388.29
General 783 26.38% 2,910 37,432.12
Manufacturers 42 1.42% 2,800 36,017.16
Real Estate 192 6.47% 2,725 35,052.42
Building Trades 20 0.67% 2,400 30,871.85
Merchants 1252 42.18% 2,352 30,254.42
Wage Earners and 
Small Shopkeepers
251 8.46% 1,414 18,188.67
Person Charged 
with Crimes
31 1.04% 1,281 16,477.85
Others 184 6.20% 2,706 34,808.01
1 Fagen at 99. 
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Appendix D
Median 1939 Income of Jewish Lawyers Classified by Organization of Law Practice1
Organization of 
Practice
Number 
Reporting
Percentage Median Income 
(1937 Dollars)
Median 
Income
(2002 Dollars)
Solo Practitioner 1,752 61.00% 1,874 24,105
Head of Office 192 6.69% 8,879 114,213
Member of Firm 429 14.94% 4,137 53,215
Employee of Firm 411 14.31% 2,157 27,745
Employed on 
Legal Staff of 
Business
88 3.06% 3,960 50,939
Total for Jewish 
Lawyers
2,872 100.00% 2,426 31,206
1
 Fagen at 96. 
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Appendix E
Organization of Legal Practice by Years of Practice for Jewish Lawyers and General New York 
City Bar1, 1939
Years of 
Practice
Single 
Practitioners
Heads of 
Offices
Firm Members Employees
J G J G J G J G
0-4 
 
54.35 40.59 1.04 7.91 34.85 12.23 9.74 39.27
5-10 69.29 42.46 2.46 14.38 18.06 21.00 11.82 22.16
11-16 64.65 35.45 7.40 20.90 8.00 32.38 19.93 11.27
17-23 57.93 36.53 15.45 18.75 4.29 35.34 22.31 9.38
24-34 58.81 29.85 21.26 33.38 2.71 31.53 17.19 5.24
35+ 41.66 29.43 28.12 27.93 1.04 39.62 29.16 3.02
AJ@ stands for Jewish lawyers, and AG@ stands for general membership of the Bar.
1
 Fagen at 101. 
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Appendix F
Median Net Incomes for Jewish Lawyers (1937) and General Bar Membership (1933) According to 
Experience1
Years of Practice Jewish Lawyers 
(1937 Dollars)
Jewish Lawyers 
(2002 Dollars)
General Lawyers 
(1933 Dollars)
General Lawyers 
(2002 Dollars)
0-4 
 
1,031 13,262.03 1,794 24,812.40
5-10 2,070 26,626.97 3,164 43,760.56
11-16 3,408 43,838.03 5,547 76,719.28
17-23 5,378 69,178.68 6,647 91,933.13
24-34 4,907 63,120.08 6,572 90,895.82
34+ 5,000 64,316.36 8,068 111,586.70
1
 Fagen at 92. 
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Appendix G
Nativity of Jewish Lawyers and of General New York City Bar Membership, 19391
Nativity Jewish (%) General (%)
Native-Born 68.6% 80.8%
Foreign-Born 17.8% 18.6%
Not Specified 13.5% 0.6%
1
 Fagen at 79. 
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Appendix H
Type of College Attended by Religion and Social Class Background, 19601
Percent of lawyers who attended an Ivy League or top-quality 
college outside New York City
Religion High Parental SES Middle Parental 
SES
Low Parental SES
Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number
Protestant 70 64 42 12 28 18
Jewish 34 169 17 133 9 211
Catholic 19 47 10 21 10 52
1
 Carlin at 29. 
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Appendix I
Membership in Large Firms by Type of Law School, Law School Standing, and Religion1, 1960
Type of Law School Protestant Catholic Jewish
  %    #   %    # Percent Number
Full-Time 
University
Law 
Review
69 13 0 5 11 27
All 
Others
26 54 40 20 8 116
Mixed Law 
School
Law 
Review
0 2 24 17 3 59
All 
Others
10 30 5 82 0 343
1
 Carlin at 31. 
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Appendix J
Membership in the Two Main City Bar Associations by Size of Firm1, 1960
Bar 
Association
Large Firm Medium Small Solo 
Practitioner
Association of 
the Bar of the 
City of New 
York
61 36 13 10
New York 
County 
Lawyers? 
Association
27 41 50 47
1
 Carlin at 36. 
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Appendix K
Disposition of Derivative Shareholder Suits by Year 1930-19421
Year Jurisdi
ction
Number 
of Suits 
(Not 
Including 
Consolida
ted Suits)
Percenta
ge of 
Successf
ul Suits2
Percentage 
of AStrike 
Suits@3
Percentage 
Plaintiff=s 
Losses 
based on 
Judgments 
on the 
Merits
Percentage 
Pending, 
Dormant, or 
Removed 
from Court
Disposi
tion 
Unclear
Number 
of Cases 
where 
there was 
Actual 
Recovery 
to 
Corporati
on4
1932 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
84 32.14% 
(21 
Settleme
nts, 2 
Private 
Settleme
nts, 3 
Nominal 
Settleme
nts, and 
1 
Judgme
nt)
11.90% (10) 8.33% (7) 35.71% (2 
Pending, 2 
Removed, 4 
Dormant, 2 
Action 
Enjoined, 
20 
Discontinue
d)
11.90% 
(10)
1.19% 
(1)
SDNY 14 7.14% 
(1)
28.57% (4) 7.14% (1) 57.14% (2 
Remanded 
to Sup. Ct. 
and 6 
Discontinue
d)
0.00% 
(0)
0.00% 
(0)
Kings 
County
0
1
 From Wood Report Appendix.
2
 Successful suits include judgments in favor of the plaintiff and settlements.
3
 Strike Suit here is defined as suits that did not for whatever reason go beyond a dismissal or 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
4
 Some settlements and judgments were nominal pittances while others were rather monumental 
victories for the plaintiffs (in the millions of dollars).
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1933 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
145 27.59% 
(31 
Settleme
nts, 3 
Private 
Settleme
nts, 2 
Nominal 
Settleme
nts, 3 
Judgme
nts, and 
1 
Settleme
nt After 
Judgme
nt)
10.34% (13, 
1 
Consensual 
Dismissal, 
and 1 
Consensual 
Dismissal 
on the 
Merits)
7.59% (11) 24.14% (1 
Dormant, 5 
Removed, 
and 29 
Discontinue
d)
30.34% 
(44)
5.52% 
(8)
SDNY 7 14.29% 
(1 
Settleme
nt)
0.00% (0) 0.00% (0) 85.71% (1 
Remand to 
Sup. Ct. and 
5 
Discontinue
d)
0.00% 
(0)
14.29% 
(1)
Kings 
Count
y
0
1934 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
77 22.08% 
(15 
Settleme
nts, 1 
Nominal 
Settleme
nt 1 
Judgme
nt but 
Defenda
nt was 
Judgme
nt 
Proof) 
Note 
that one 
settleme
10.39% (7 
and 1 was 
because 
Def. was in 
Bankruptcy 
Court)
11.69% (8 
Judgments 
and 1 
Reversal)
29.87% (1 
Pending, 1 
Dormant, 3 
Transferred, 
and 18 
Discontinue
d)
25.97% 
(20)
1.30% 
(1)
81
nt 
disposed 
of the 
BOD.
SDNY 6 50.00% 
(3 
Settleme
nts)
33.33% (2) 0.00% (0) 16.67% (1 
Discontinue
d)
0.00% 
(0)
0.00% 
(0)
Kings 
Count
y
0
1935 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
139 33.09% 
(40 
Settleme
nts, 4 
Nominal 
Settleme
nts, and 
2 
Judgme
nts)
10.79% (14 
and 1 by 
Consent)
4.32% (6) 37.41% (1 
Pending, 6 
Removed, 1 
Transferred, 
8 Dormant, 
and 36 
Discontinue
d)
14.39% 
(20)
15.79% 
(3)
SDNY 10 0.00% 
(0)
10.00% (1 
Comp. 
Dismissed)
0.00% (0) 90.00% (1 
Remand to 
Sup. Ct. and 
8 
Discontinue
d)
0.00% 
(0)
0.00% 
(0)
Kings 
Count
y
0
1936 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
82 25.61% 
(19 
Settleme
nts, 1 
Judgme
nt, and 1 
Settleme
nt After 
Judgme
nt)
14.63% (12) 6.10% (5) 43.90% (1 
Pending, 1 
Dormant, 
10 
Removed, 
and 24 
Discontinue
d)
9.76% 
(8)
2.44% 
(2)
SDNY 9 33.33% 
(3 
55.55% (5) 11.11% (1) 0.00% (0) 0.00% 
(0)
11.11% 
(1)
82
Settleme
nts)
Kings 
Count
y
0
1937 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
73 28.77% 
(18 
Settleme
nts, 1 
Nominal 
Settleme
nt, and 2 
Judgme
nts)
16.44% (12) 15.07% (11) 28.77% (3 
Dormant, 2 
Removed, 
and 16 
Discontinue
d)
10.96% 
(8)
2.74% 
(2)
SDNY 11 27.27% 
(2 
Settleme
nts, 1 
Judgme
nt)
18.18% (2) 9.09% (1) 45.45% (1 
Removed, 
and 4 
Discontinue
d)
0.00% 
(0)
0.00% 
(0)
Kings 
Count
y
0
1938 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
101 29.70% 
(22 
Settleme
nts, 3 
Nominal 
Settleme
nts, 1 
Settleme
nt after 
Judgme
nt for 
Plaintiff, 
4 
Judgme
nts)
9.90% (10) 10.89% (11) 31.68% (2 
Pending, 2 
Removed or 
Transferred, 
25 
Discontinue
d, and 3 
Dormant)
17.82% 
(15 and 
3 
Supers
eded by 
Rec. 
Action)
5.94% 
(6)
SDNY 14 35.71% 
(4 
Settleme
nts and 
1 
14.29% (2) 0.00% (0) 50.00% (2 
Removed or 
Remanded, 
5 
Discontinue
0.00% 
(0)
7.14% 
(1)
83
Judgme
nt)
d)
Kings 
Count
y
30 26.67% 
(7 
Settleme
nts and 
1 
Judgme
nt)
6.67% (2) 10.00% (3) 26.67% (1 
Pending, 2 
Dormant, 1 
to Referee 
and 4 
Discontinue
d)
30.00% 
(9)
3.33% 
(1)
1939 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
89 17.98% 
(9 
Settleme
nts, 1 
Nominal 
Settleme
nt, and 6 
Judgme
nts)
20.22% (18) 12.36% (10 
and 1 on 
Consent)
39.33% (4 
Pending, 4 
Removed, 
23 
Discontinue
d, 2 
Dormant 
and 1 
Vacated 
Service and 
1 Dismissed 
as to 3 
defendants 
and dormant 
as to others.
10.11% 
(8 and 
1 for 
Apprai
sal)
4.49% (3 
Payments 
and 1 
Failed 
Payment)
SDNY 16 6.25% 
(1 
Settleme
nt)
62.50% (10) 12.50% (2) 18.75% (1 
Pending, 1 
Removed 
and 1 
Discontinue
d)
0.00% 
(0)
0.00% 
(0)
Kings 
Count
y
14 28.57% 
(4 
Judgme
nts)
28.57% (3 
and 1 
Motion to 
examine 
denied)
0.00% (0) 28.57% (1 
Pending 1 
Removed, 2 
Discontinue
d)
14.29% 
(2)
0.00% 
(0)
1940 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
132 29.55% 
(32 
Settleme
nts, 1 
Settled 
Nominal
ly, and 6 
Judgme
9.85% (13) 12.12% (16) 28.03% (10 
Pending and 
27 
Discontinue
d)
20.45% 
(27)
3.03% 
(4)
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nts)
SDNY 10 20.0% 
(1 
Settleme
nt and 1 
Judgme
nt)
40.0% (4) 10.0% (1) 20.0% (2) 10.0% 
(1)
0.00% 
(0)
Kings 
Count
y
17 5.88% 
(1)
11.76% (2) 11.76% (2) 29.41% (1 
Pending and 
4 
Discontinue
d)
41.18% 
(7)
0.00% 
(0)
1941 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
75 16.0% 
(7 
Settleme
nts and 
5 
Judgme
nts
21.33% (16) 10.66% (8) 27.0% (13 
Pending + 
14 
Discontinue
d)
16.0% 
(12)
9.33% 
(7)
SDNY 13 7.69% 
(1 
Settleme
nt)
61.54% (8) 
(1 for no 
Juris.)
7.69% (1) 23.08% (2 
Pending)
0.00% 
(0)
0.00% 
(0)
Kings 
Count
y
37 27.03% 
(9 
Settleme
nts and 
1 
Judgme
nt)
10.81% (4) 5.40% (2) 21.62% (8) 35.14% 
(13)
0.00% 
(0)
1942 First 
Depart
ment 
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
92 17.31% 
(16 
Settleme
nts and 
2 
Judgme
nts)
19.23% (20) 7.69% (8) 16.35% (17) 27.88% 
(29)
1.92% 
(2)
SDNY 14 6.67% 
(1 
Settleme
nt)
33.33% (5) 
(Two b/c 
Lack of 
Juris.)
13.33% (2) 40.00% (6) 0% (0)
Kings 26 11.54% 11.54% (3) 7.69% (2) 23.08% (6) 42.31% 3.85% 
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Count
y
(3 
Settleme
nts)
(11) (1)
86
Appendix L
Main Area of Practice by Size of Firm1, 1960
Main Area of 
Practice
Large Firm Medium Firm Small Firm Solo Practice
Business 68% 66% 27% 36%
Probate 23% 20% 17% 15%
Real Estate 5% 2% 18% 17%
Personal Injury 2% 6% 26% 22%
Criminal, 
Matrimonial, 
and Worker?s 
Comp
2% 4% 11% 9%
No Answer 0% 2% 1% 1%
Total 100% (60 
Reporting)
100% (204 
Reporting)
100% (161 
Reporting)
100% (376 
Reporting)
1
 Carlin at 25. 
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Appendix M
Individual Clients Mainly Jewish1, 1960
Large Firm (15+) Medium (5-14) Small (2-4) Solo Practice
Individual 
Clients Mainly 
Jewish
14% 34% 46% 44%
1
 Carlin at 24. 
88
Net Income Per Family1 2
1944 In 2002
Dollars3
20014 In 2002
Dollars5
United States
(Median)6
2,533 25,876.90 43,388.63 44,050.31
1
 There are two forms of determining the Aaverage@ income.  The first is the per capita income which is 
simply the total income of all persons in the area divided by the number of individuals or families in the same area.  
The second is simply taking the median income which is a function of the highest and lowest incomes.  Median is 
that number that divides the group into two equal parts.  See Statistical Abstract of the United States (1949 at 12).  
For any income table, usage of mean (per capita) and median are mutually exclusive.
2
 The average number of people in families has fluctuated.  These statistics use an average 
number of
people per family.  In 1944, this number was 3.54.  Historical Statistics of the United States (Dept. of 
Commerce 1960 at 166).
3
 Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation adjuster found at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  The multiplier was about 10.21591 from 1944 to 2002.
4
 From Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001 (Dept. of Commerce 2001 at 436).  
Household Income from 1999.  Adjusted to 2001 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of 
Labor online inflation adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  The multiplier was about 
1.06303 from 1999 to 2001.
5 Adjusted to 2002 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation 
adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  The multiplier was about 1.01525 from 2001 to 
2002.
6 Statistical Abstract of the United States (1949 at 290).
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New York M: 2,369.367 M: 22,399.61 42,582.86 43,232.25
W: 1,260.11 W: 12,873.15
Net Income Per Individual
19461 In 2002
Dollars2
20013 In 20024
Dollars
United States 1,213 24,205.17 30,520.58 30,986.02
New York 1,651 15,223.06 35,530.21 36,072.04
7
 Figures per 1950 Census, Vol. II Characteristics of the Population, Part 32, Page 32-446.  The 
1940 Census was the first census using net incomes, and the 1950 census was the first census using 
families as economic units.  The 1950 census numbers here use 1949 estimates of net incomes for 
persons (males and females separately) as heads of families.  Of course, this information fails to adjust 
for families that have two incomes while commonplace today was still rare in the late 1940s.  Figures 
found were adjusted downward by using U.S. Department of Labor online inflation adjuster found at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  The multiplier was about 0.73950 from 1949 to 1944.
1
 Per Capita is Based on Closest Year (1946).
2
 Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation adjuster found at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  The multiplier was about 9.22051 from 1946 to 2002.
3
 From Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001 (Dept. of Commerce 2001 at 426).  Net 
Income from 2000.  Adjusted to 2001 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online 
inflation adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  The multiplier was about 1.02846 from
2000 to 2001.
4
 Adjusted to 2001 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation 
adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data.  The multiplier was about 9.22051 from 2001 to 
2002.
